From the bronze of the Premier League to the relegation zone: why Michael Carrick did not succeed in the MU

Manchester United announced on November 12 the dismissal of head coach Michael Carrick. After 10 rounds of the English Premier League (Premier League), the team scored eight points and ended up in 18th place in the standings. At the same time, six months ago, an English specialist led the Mancunians to third place in the championship and returned the club to the Champions League, for which he received a full-fledged two-year contract. Why Carrick could not repeat last year's success, what mistakes the management made and what is happening to the once best club in England — in the Izvestia article.

Why Manchester United appointed Michael Carrick

In January 2026, Manchester United fired Portuguese specialist Ruben Amorim, who had been in charge of the team since November 2024. Michael Carrick, a former Mancunian midfielder and one of the most decorated footballers in the club's modern history, was appointed interim head coach on January 13.

During his 12 years at Old Trafford, the Englishman won the Premier League five times, won the Champions League in 2008, and also won the FA Cup, the English League Cup and the Europa League. After finishing his playing career in 2018, Carrick joined the club's coaching staff, worked with Jose Mourinho and Ole Gunnar Solskjaer, and in 2021 he temporarily led the team after the Norwegian was fired.

Carrick continued his independent coaching career at Middlesbrough from the Championship. By the time he returned to Manchester, he had some coaching experience. At the same time, the position of the MU after Amorim's departure was not as catastrophic as it might seem against the background of Carrick's subsequent successes. The Portuguese left the team in sixth place in the Premier League. Compared to the previous season, when the Mancunians finished 15th, the progress was obvious.

Amorim was criticized primarily for his inflexible adherence to the three-center-back scheme. Because of her, Bruno Fernandes often acted deeper than his usual position, and some players were forced to perform unusual functions on the flanks. At the same time, the Portuguese paid great attention to the physical fitness of the team. Therefore, part of the success of his successor can be viewed in the context of the work done by the previous staff.

Subsequently, Carrick abandoned the scheme with three central defenders, brought Fernandes back closer to the attack and gave the players more freedom. The changes quickly brought results: in the first two matches under his leadership, Manchester City defeated Manchester City (2:0) and Arsenal (3:2).

Why did the management decide to keep Carrick

Under Carrick's leadership, the team won 12 of the 17 remaining league matches, finished in third place and qualified for the Champions League for the first time in two seasons.

Captain Bruno Fernandes finished the season with 21 assists, setting an absolute Premier League record. Previously, the achievement belonged to Thierry Henry and Kevin De Bruyne, who each made 20 assists. Moreover, Fernandes scored 12 assists in the first 16 league matches under Carrick's leadership. The English specialist managed to stabilize the situation in the locker room, improve the results and restore confidence to the players. However, the success had several significant caveats.

First of all, MU practically did not participate in other competitions. The team did not compete in European competitions, was eliminated from the English League Cup under Amorim, and in January lost to Brighton in the FA Cup. As a result, Carrick got an exceptionally comfortable calendar — one match per week.

In addition, the change of coach had the expected emotional effect. After hard work with the demanding Amorim, the players received a specialist with a more relaxed approach and clear playing duties. The problem was that short-term stabilization did not guarantee long-term success.

Despite lingering doubts, on May 22, the MU management signed a contract with Carrick until 2028.

Summer transfers: how the management did not help the coach

After returning to the Champions League, Manchester United faced the task of strengthening the squad to compete in several tournaments at once. The club spent significant funds on the central line and Carlos Baleba came from Brighton for £70 million, Andrei Santos was acquired from Chelsea for £50 million, and Aston Villa paid £35 million for Yuri Thielemans.

All three of the most expensive newcomers represented the central line, while the defense received almost no full-fledged reinforcement. The club was interested in Newcastle left-back Lewis Hall, but failed to complete the deal. As a result, Carrick was left with the same set of flank defenders. Diogo Dalot continued to play on the right edge, which is distinguished by its efficiency and versatility, but does not always provide the necessary quality in positional attacks and reliability during defensive transitions.

On the left flank, MU was still dependent on Luke Shaw. The Englishman is highly qualified, but he has been repeatedly injured throughout his career. It is significant that Shaw managed to play with Carrick, after which he ended his career, became a coach, gained independent experience in the Championship and returned to Manchester, while his former partner was still one of the main options on the left flank of the defense.

The shortcomings of the recruitment cannot be considered the only reason for the failure, but they seriously limited the coach's capabilities. The MU has strengthened individual positions, but has not formed a balanced squad for the new game model. In modern football, it is not only the head coach who is responsible for this, because the transfer strategy and the formation of the squad belong to the powers of the sports leadership. In Manchester, this work was supervised by Director of Football Jason Wilcox and CEO Omar Berrada.

Why did Carrick fail

The new season began for Manchester United with an unexpected defeat from the Premier League newcomer Hull City with a score of 0:2. A week later, the team defeated Ipswich (5-2), but this victory remained the only one in the first 10 rounds of the championship.

This was followed by a defeat to Manchester City (0:1), draws with Fulham (1:1), Tottenham (1:1) and Leeds (1:1). In September, the Mancunians also crashed out of the English League Cup, losing to Brighton with a score of 2:3.

The match against Manchester City turned out to be particularly significant, in which the opponent remained in the minority after Phil Foden was eliminated, but Carrick's team could not effectively take advantage of the numerical advantage. The match ended in defeat, and MY Team created chances by only 0.95 of the expected goal (xG).

In October, the problems worsened. In the Champions League, the British lost to Atletico Madrid (0:2), and then suffered a crushing defeat from the Italian Como (1:4). In the latter case, MU conceded in the second minute and was unable to regain control of the game. On October 25, the team lost at home to Bournemouth with a score of 0:3. This defeat was one of the main reasons for discussing the possible dismissal of Carrick. By that time, the Mancunians had not won the championship for almost two months.

After that, Carrick got three more matches to rectify the situation. But Manchester United lost to Chelsea (0:2), narrowly beat Roma in the Champions League (3:2), conceding two goals during the meeting, and then drew with Aston Villa (4:4).

Notably, in the fall, Carrick tried to make the team more possession-oriented. According to Opta, the average ownership rate has increased from about 49% in the second half of last season to 58% at the beginning of the new season. However, such changes did not match the strengths of the existing composition. In the spring, MU was dangerous primarily in fast attacks and transitional phases, when Bruno Fernandes could instantly deliver the ball to his partners, while in the fall the team had to open the opponent's saturated defense much more often on their own.

The pressure has also changed. According to Opta, the proportion of time when Mancunians used the high block increased from 26% to 42%. But defenders and midfielders did not always have enough mobility to maintain a high defensive line and close the space behind their partners in a timely manner. Physical fitness became a separate subject of criticism. In the summer, rookie Juri Thielemans, in a conversation with Rio Ferdinand, said that there was not much running work at the pre-season training camp. Against the background of unsuccessful results, this raised questions about the intensity of Carrick's training.

Manchester United ran an average of 103.1 km in 90 minutes, one of the worst records in the Premier League.

How the MU fired Carrick

After the home defeat to Bournemouth on October 25, the Manchester United leadership seriously considered the possibility of Carrick's immediate resignation. However, they decided to give him extra time — meetings with Chelsea, Roma and Aston Villa. The specialist's situation finally became more complicated after the draw with Aston Villa on November 8. The team took a place in the relegation zone, and the management began an internal evaluation of the results of the first part of the season.

Already on November 9, journalists reported that the club was going to fire Carrick. The next day, they wrote about the management's serious doubts about the coach's ability to change the situation. On November 10, Carrick arrived at the Carrington training base and continued his duties. The next day, the club's leaders discussed his future at a meeting in Monaco, while the British press was already actively naming a possible successor, Mauricio Pochettino.

On November 12, the club officially announced Carrick's dismissal. In a statement, the MU stressed that the decision was due to the unsuccessful start of the season and the need to match the ambitions of the club. The very method of parting has attracted criticism. Former Crystal Palace owner Simon Jordan called the treatment of the coach unworthy, pointing out that information about his possible dismissal appeared in the media long before the official decision.

Of course, the club had reasons to change a specialist, but the protracted procedure looked especially painful for a man who had spent a significant part of his life at Manchester United and had returned the team to the Champions League just a few months earlier.

Why is the MU's main problem with leadership

Carrick's dismissal was another episode of the managerial crisis that has been going on at Manchester United for many years since Alex Ferguson's departure in 2013. During this time, the club has repeatedly changed coaches, transfer priorities and game philosophy, but has not created a sustainable development system.

The arrival of INEOS, led by Jim Ratcliffe, was supposed to change the situation. The British billionaire gained control of football operations, and the new management structure promised a more consistent approach to sports decisions. However, the story of Eric ten Hag has already shown serious contradictions.

In the 2023/24 season, the Dutch specialist took the eighth place in the Premier League with the MU - the worst at that time for the club in the entire history of the tournament. Despite this, after the unexpected victory over Manchester City in the FA Cup final, the management decided to keep the coach and extended his contract.

This decision was made against the background of a wide discussion of a possible resignation, because the preservation of ten Haga made it possible to avoid conflict with some of the fans who supported the specialist after winning the trophy. But in October 2024, after another series of unsuccessful results, the coach was fired. Compensation to Ten Hag and his staff cost the club 10.4 million pounds. Additionally, the MU paid about £11 million for the invitation of Ruben Amorim from Sporting Lisbon.

Amorim adhered to a certain football philosophy and demanded appropriate performers. Under his leadership, the club spent significant funds to strengthen the squad, but after the disastrous 2024/25 season, which ended in 15th place, the situation remained tense. Although Manchester United had risen to sixth place by January 2026, disagreements between the coach and the management escalated due to the fact that Amorim openly criticized interference in his work: after the match with Leeds, he stressed that he had come to Manchester to be a manager, not just a coach.

Soon the specialist was fired. The club's maximum compensation obligations to Amorim and his staff were estimated at almost £16 million.

This was followed by the appointment of Carrick, and the management again changed the direction of the team's development, entrusting it to a specialist with a different game approach. At the same time, a significant part of the team was formed under previous coaches.

When dealing with sports issues, management regularly focuses on short-term results and public pressure. Ten Haga's FA Cup victory allowed him to retain his position, Carrick's successful spring brought a two-year contract, and an unsuccessful autumn led to another resignation.

The fans' discontent continues to grow. The protests against the Glazer family, who bought MU in 2005, gradually spread to Ratcliffe and INEOS. On November 8, before the match with Aston Villa, fans organized another rally at Old Trafford. Green and gold balloons appeared on the Stretford End grandstand, the traditional colors of protest against the owners. The fans also posted a banner demanding a change of ownership instead of building a new stadium.

After 10 rounds, Manchester United is in the relegation zone. Even if the new coach quickly corrects the situation in the table, this will not mean a way out of the systemic crisis. In recent years, the club has repeatedly demonstrated its ability to achieve local successes, but much less often to turn them into sustainable development.

In the meantime, the management of Manchester United continues to extinguish individual flames, without eliminating the main source of ignition.