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How Bessent spins the Treasury twist, but the US economy is playing against it. Analysis

The market played out Bessent's signal about Treasury twist
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The main thing in the material:

• From September 9, the U.S. Treasury Department will at least double the purchase of long—term government bonds, from a maximum of $2 billion to at least $4 billion per transaction. The head of the department, Scott Bessent, called the maneuver a Treasury twist. With his help, he expects to support long-term securities and restrain the growth of their profitability.

• After the announcement of this plan, long-term bond yields declined, but soon returned to previous levels. The reason is that investors take into account not only the supply on the market, but also the huge US government debt, inflation risks and Fed policy. These are factors that the Ministry of Finance has little or no influence on.

• The US need for new loans remains huge: in July –September alone, the Ministry of Finance expects to attract $739 billion on the market. Therefore, buybacks can only partially reduce the supply of long-term securities, but not the total flow of new government debt.

• The real effect of Treasury twist will appear after September 9th. If additional demand from the Ministry of Finance does not restrain the growth of long yields, this will show that Bessent's maneuver is not enough to influence the market and the economic risks have turned out to be stronger.

Starting from September, the US Treasury will at least double the purchase of long-term government bonds. The head of the ministry, Scott Bessent, calls this maneuver Treasury twist and expects to affect yields at the far end of the curve in this way. The first reaction of the market was sharp, but short-lived: yields on long Treasuries initially went down, but by early September they returned to the levels they were at before the announcement of the Ministry of Finance. Why Bessent decided to intervene in the government debt market and what the United States faces from the failure of Treasury twist — Izvestia figured out.

Why do you need Treasury twist?

On August 19, the Ministry of Finance announced that it would at least double the purchase of long-term government bonds from September 9 to November 4. The size of each such transaction with securities for a period of 10-20 and 20-30 years will grow from a maximum of $2 billion to at least $4 billion. The Ministry of Finance explained the decision with the desire to maintain the liquidity of long-term issues. By increasing their repurchase, the agency simultaneously creates additional demand for these securities, which can raise their price and reduce yields, which have risen to 5.3% on 30-year bonds, to peaks that have not been seen since 2007. Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent, who actively criticized his predecessor Janet Yellen for interfering in the bond market, called this strategy Treasury twist, similar to the operations that the Fed conducted back in the 1960s.

Izvestia reference

Against the backdrop of the recession and the outflow of gold from the United States in 1961, the administration of President John F. Kennedy decided to lower long-term interest rates, while not lowering short ones. To do this, the authorities reduced the supply of long government bonds on the market and at the same time increased the supply of short ones. The strategy, which consisted in, in fact, "twisting" the yield curve, was called Operation twist (with reference to the then popular dance). According to experts, the operation reduced the profitability of long-term Treasuries by about 0.15 percentage points.

The Fed returned to this idea in September 2011, when the American economy was still recovering from the global financial crisis. By the end of June 2012, the regulator decided to buy $400 billion of Treasuries with a maturity of six to 30 years and simultaneously sell the same amount of securities with a maturity of up to three years. Thus, the Fed increased the average maturity of bonds in its portfolio, practically without changing its total size. Later, the program was extended until the end of 2012: the Fed planned to buy about $267 billion more long-term Treasuries, while reducing the portfolio of short-term securities by a comparable amount.

Past experience shows that such a scheme can indeed reduce long-term rates, but its possibilities are limited. Given the small volumes (compared to the size of the $32 trillion government bond market), it is difficult to expect that this program alone will lead to a real turning point.

After the announcement of the Permanent plan, long-term bond yields declined, but began to recover the next day. By the end of the week, on August 21, the yield on ten—year Treasuries reached 4.74%, almost the highest level since he joined the Ministry of Finance, and thirty—year Treasuries reached 5.27%. In early September, yields remained at about the same levels. But we must understand that the market has so far issued a verdict not on the operations themselves, but on the signal sent by the Ministry of Finance.

Izvestia reference

The U.S. Treasury Department is responsible for financing federal government expenditures and managing the national debt. Its task is to meet the budget's borrowing needs with minimal costs in the long term, while keeping the government bond market liquid and predictable. The Fed is responsible for monetary policy, including maintaining price stability.

Treasury yields are important not only for the cost of servicing the US government debt. U.S. government bonds serve as a benchmark for the financial market: rates on corporate bonds, mortgages, and other instruments depend on their yields. Therefore, a decrease in Treasury yields may lead to a softening of financial conditions in the economy.

Why does the strategy look unusual

For the Ministry of Finance, bond repurchase is not a new tool, although it has previously been used in a completely different budget situation. In the late 1990s, the federal budget went into surplus, the government's need for borrowing decreased, and the volume of new bond placements decreased. In order to maintain market liquidity, in 2000-2002, the Ministry of Finance bought back old bonds, which made it possible to keep new issues large enough. In two years, the Ministry of Finance conducted 45 bond repurchase operations for $67.5 billion. After that, for more than 20 years, the Ministry of Finance did not conduct significant buybacks, although it periodically made small buybacks.

In 2024, he launched a new program that was supposed to solve two tasks — managing cash balances and maintaining market liquidity. The latter primarily concerns old government bond issues, which are trading worse than new ones.

Even at the stage of preparing the program, the Ministry of Finance emphasized that buybacks should not turn into a one-time or situational intervention tool and are not designed to deal with acute periods of market stress. There were no plans to use them to change the ratio of short and long debt — new placements were to remain the main tool for this. The operations were supposed to be carried out regularly and predictably, over the entire curve and on a limited scale.

Izvestia reference

The Ministry of Finance as a whole has much less scope for large-scale bond purchases than the Fed. The central bank does not need to borrow money in the market beforehand: when buying securities, it can create bank reserves. This allows for transactions worth trillions of dollars under quantitative easing programs, affecting the yield curve and reducing the cost of government borrowing.

The Ministry of Finance does not have such an opportunity — it has to finance every dollar allocated for buyback through new borrowings. A sharp increase in repurchases would therefore require a simultaneous increase in the issuance of other government bonds. The Ministry of Finance can change the ratio of supply and demand in certain areas of the debt market, but it is not able to support long-term bonds with unlimited purchases, like the Fed.

By the end of September 2025, the Ministry of Finance had purchased $113 billion of bonds to manage cash balances and more than $115 billion to support secondary market liquidity. At the same time, it was emphasized that the operations did not lead to a significant change in the structure of the national debt — the weighted average maturity was reduced by only a few weeks. At the same time, market participants actively offered long-term bonds to the Ministry of Finance. And this is directly related to Bessent's current decision. The agency explained its August decision to increase the amount of buybacks in these segments with a high interest in transactions with securities for 10-20 and 20-30 years. That is, the build-up of buybacks did not arise from scratch.

Although technically nothing extraordinary has happened (the Ministry of Finance is expanding the existing buyback program), Bessent's maneuver looks atypical. The traditional philosophy of American debt management is based on the principle of "regularity and predictability." Historically, the Ministry has deliberately avoided attempts to predict market movements and has not built a borrowing structure based on the current shape of the yield curve.

However, Bessent himself associated Treasury twist with excessively high, in his opinion, long-term returns. Because of this, the increase in purchases of long-term securities is difficult to separate from the administration's desire to reduce the cost of long-term financing. In fact, buybacks are beginning to take on the features of a macroeconomic policy tool. This is not yet a policy of profitability control, but it is also not a completely neutral market service.

It was this shift that drew criticism from major investors. Wall Street legend Stanley Druckenmiller— a longtime mentor of Bessent (as well as Fed Chairman Kevin Warsh), publicly opposed his protege's decision, regarding it as an attempt to control the price of bonds.

Subsequently, Bessent's rhetoric became more cautious. He acknowledged that the Finance Ministry is unable to determine the "equilibrium interest rate," and rejected the suggestion that it is trying to artificially set the cost of long-term borrowings. According to the minister, he can only slow down the sharp movements of the market and try to avoid an extreme scenario.

Why is the market playing against a Competitor and what will happen if Treasury twist doesn't work?

The ability of the Issuer to influence long bets is limited by factors that are beyond the control of the Ministry of Finance. Yields on long-term government bonds recovered quickly after the initial decline, as their level depends not only on the volume of securities on the market. Investors are taking into account a number of risks: a record level of government debt, which has reached $40 trillion, an increase in corporate bond issuance amid a boom in investments in artificial intelligence and competition for capital, continuing inflationary risks due to the conflict in the Middle East, as well as uncertainty surrounding the Fed's future policy.

The scale of future borrowings is especially important. The federal budget deficit in the first ten months of fiscal year 2026 reached $1.8 trillion— $169 billion more than a year earlier. In July and September alone, the Ministry of Finance expects to attract another $739 billion in the market. Therefore, even if Treasury twist reduces the supply of long-term bonds somewhat, the total flow of new government debt will remain huge.

The real effect of the program can be assessed after September 9th. If, despite the build-up of buybacks, long yields continue to rise, this will mean that the influence of fundamental factors has turned out to be stronger than Treasury twist. By itself, the failure of the strategy does not mean that the debt crisis in the United States is approaching, but it will show that the Ministry of Finance has few effective levers of influence.

At the same time, maintaining high yields will gradually increase the budget's interest costs: as old bonds mature, they will have to be replaced with new ones issued at higher rates. For companies and households, high rates on the long end also mean more expensive borrowing. At the same time, the profitability of government securities increases investors' demands on other assets and may put pressure on their value.

In such a situation, the Issuer will face a political and financial fork: accept the high cost of long-term borrowings or try to increase repurchases again. But the second option has a limit, since the Ministry of Finance will have to increase borrowing in other market segments to finance operations. If, as a result, the debt structure shifts more towards short-term securities, the interest rate risk will not disappear: the government will have to refinance the debt more often, and changes in market rates will affect budget expenditures faster.

In addition, the more actively the Ministry of Finance increases buybacks in response to rising yields, the more difficult it will be to convince investors that this is only about managing liquidity, and not about trying to manage the price of government debt. This creates reputational risk for the Subscriber. If market participants decide that the volume of buybacks depends on whether the administration is satisfied with the current yield, debt policy will become less predictable (and this contradicts the very traditional philosophy). And investors may demand an additional premium already for the uncertainty surrounding the possible future intervention of the Ministry of Finance in the market.

As a result, an overly aggressive continuation of the Treasury twist may have the opposite effect: by trying to reduce the cost of borrowing, the Ministry of Finance risks creating a new factor for their growth. Ultimately, thanks to the maneuver, the Issuer can temporarily support demand for long-term bonds and restrain the growth of their yields, but it is not able to lower long rates without changing fundamental conditions. As long as they remain the same, the market's answer will be simple: investors are willing to lend to the United States, but they don't want to do it cheaply.

Переведено сервисом «Яндекс Переводчик»

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