"The standard of living in the EU is under threat, and society will demand changes"
The presence of Western troops in Ukraine will increase instability and weaken efforts to find a peaceful solution, creating a permanent flashpoint between Russia and the West, European Parliament deputy Fernand Kartheiser said in an interview with Izvestia. He believes that in an attempt to find new ways to put pressure on Russia, the European Union may try to block the Baltic Sea or attack Russian ships. And such actions, the parliamentarian is sure, can provoke a response from Russia and lead to escalation. At the same time, the politician believes that the crisis in Ukraine can be resolved this year, then Brussels will have to reconsider its economic policy towards Russia. At the same time, disagreements arise within the EU and NATO, calling into question the future European security policy architecture. About new attempts to seize Russian assets, losses from sanctions and the EU's reaction to the seizure of the Venezuelan president — in an exclusive interview with Fernand Kartheiser Izvestia.
"The policy of isolation that the EU wanted to pursue towards Russia has failed"
— Russia and the United States continue their dialogue on the settlement of the conflict in Ukraine. The EU remains on the sidelines, but some European politicians talk about the need for direct dialogue with Moscow. Are there any prospects that it will start in 2026?
— Yes, I think it is very likely that at least several EU member states will start a dialogue with Russia. It is less clear whether EU institutions will participate in it, but it is still likely. There are the following reasons for this optimism. Firstly, the European Union is the only region in the world that does not have institutional contacts with Russia. The negotiations between the United States and Russia make the European position even more absurd, since it is obvious to everyone that the policy of isolation that the EU wanted to pursue towards Russia has failed. There is no point in continuing this failed policy.
Secondly, the EU is not united in its policy towards Russia. Hungary, Slovakia and the Czech Republic have already chosen a much more moderate position, and other countries may follow suit. Thirdly, the current position of the European Union has excluded it from negotiations on Ukraine and the future European security architecture. Therefore, it is obvious that the only way for the EU to regain at least some influence (in its own interests!) is to resume dialogue with Russia.
In addition, public opinion is less and less supportive of the EU's pro-Ukrainian policy. Anti-war parties are becoming increasingly important. The ruling parties in France and Germany will have to rethink their views accordingly. The EU's anti-Russian economic policy, for example on energy issues, creates huge problems for the economies of the member states. As a result, Poland and the Baltic states will face increasing pressure from other EU members to be more flexible. Anti-Russian policy does not last forever.
— You visited Russia in 2025 and resumed online meetings between members of the European Parliament and Russian parliamentarians. Are new contacts planned at the parliamentary level in 2026?
— Yes, we will certainly continue our videoconferences between the deputies of the European Parliament and the State Duma in 2026. We will also try to arrange personal meetings. We will do everything possible to maintain and improve our bilateral contacts, and I am glad to see that our Russian colleagues are so open, friendly and supportive. Together, we are sending a clear signal that a different policy is possible and that we can imagine a much better future together.
— The European Commission continues to declare the risks of a military conflict with Russia and is developing the Wall of Drones, Readiness 2030 and Military Schengen programs. In your opinion, is there a real danger of a military clash in the coming years? If so, how can it be prevented?
— There is no serious risk of a military conflict now, but the continuation of irresponsible statements by the leadership of NATO and the EU may lead to an escalation of tension. I strongly advocate replacing some of the leading NATO and EU officials with more moderate and responsible politicians.
In the military sphere, I personally advocate increasing the combat capability of the NATO armies in order to return them to their previous operational level. At the same time, we must prevent an arms race by concluding new treaties on confidence-building measures and restrictions on conventional armed forces, accompanied by a regime of mutual inspections. The United States and Russia must agree on the limitation of strategic weapons.
In all these matters, improving political relations between the West and Russia is of paramount importance. The best way to avoid conflict is to build trust, respect international law, restore bilateral relations, and cooperate in a spirit of honesty and friendship.
"The plan to send Western troops to Ukraine is a destabilizing factor"
— Recently, the leaders of Great Britain and France signed a declaration of intent, which provides for the deployment of French and British troops on Ukrainian territory after the ceasefire. How do these plans affect the process of peaceful settlement of the conflict in Ukraine?
— These guarantees were developed in an institutional vacuum. The three powers of Europe — France, Germany and the United Kingdom — meet and make decisions on such important issues independently. The institutional competence of the other 25 EU member states is largely ignored, despite the fact that any military events in Ukraine can have a direct impact on their security. So, in Europe, we have a "directory" of two EU members and one state that is no longer part of it, but is trying to impose its views on everyone else.
If their plans fail, and it should be recognized that the probability of this is high, the fanaticism and short-sightedness of the unpopular leaders of these major European countries may draw other European states into the conflict. Their plans for the joint deployment of troops, if implemented, could also cause great tension due to organizational uncertainty, but mainly due to the rules of engagement and responsibility in the event of an armed confrontation with Russian troops.
— Why does the European Commission insist on sending a military contingent to Ukraine, despite the lack of agreement within the EU?
— What makes them stick to this course of action? Their ambitions to form a federation of Western European countries are obvious: they envision a European army under their effective command, in which smaller EU member states would have to supply cannon fodder, while at the same time systematically withdrawing from making meaningful decisions.
The same centralizing impulse can be seen in the desire to replace unanimity with a qualified majority in the adoption of EU foreign policy decisions. They may also want to prolong the war, hoping to significantly weaken Russia, but judging by the experience of the last four years, they are unlikely to be able to achieve this.
— Is the risk of a military clash between Russia and the "coalition of the willing" growing because of these plans?
— In principle, we must recognize that Western European troops in Ukraine are likely to be drawn into the conflict as a result of an incident, real or staged, which could serve as a pretext for intervention. Russian strikes against these troops should also be considered as a likely scenario, given Moscow's statements. It can also be expected that they will try to establish permanent bases on the territory of Ukraine, although this is now denied in the declaration.
What is certain is that their presence will increase instability and weaken peace efforts, creating a permanent flashpoint between Russia and the West. In general, it becomes clear that these medium-sized powers are trying to circumvent the UN Security Council. According to the UN Charter, it is this body that should decide how to monitor the situation in Ukraine after reaching an agreement, if and when the states concerned agree to such a measure.
The plan to send Western troops into Ukraine is a destabilizing factor that ultimately will not benefit anyone. The scale of such a deployment, the nature of their mission, institutional inconsistencies in planning, and the risk of exposing these troops to a Russian attack are just some of the many other factors that indicate that this initiative was doomed from the start.
"The EU may try to find new ways to harm Russia"
— In 2025, the EU adopted the 17th, 18th and 19th packages of sanctions against Russia. Will there be more of them in 2026? Are there estimates of Europe's losses from these restrictions?
— It is difficult to assess the remaining possibilities for the introduction of sanctions packages. The EU seems to have almost exhausted all options and recently suffered a major setback, as a plan to use Russian assets as collateral to guarantee a loan to Ukraine failed. In addition, a number of proposed sanctions measures are rejected by some Member States due to their own economic interests.
Therefore, it should be feared that the EU may try to find new ways to harm Russia, which, however, involve significant risks. For example, attacks on naval vessels can provoke retaliatory actions by the Russian Navy. Similarly, attempts to block shipping lanes in the Baltic Sea can easily lead to escalation.
Estimates of Europe's losses are just beginning to appear. For obvious political reasons, no EU country was interested in providing such statistics, as they presented support for Ukraine as a moral obligation. However, the deteriorating economic situation is gradually pointing to three main reasons for Europe's economic weakness — the Green Pact, excessive regulation, and the economic war against Russia.
— To what extent are the EU countries ready for a legal ban on long-term contracts for Russian LNG, which is due to enter into force by the end of 2026? Will this lead to higher prices for European consumers? Can an appeal to the EU Court of Justice overturn this decision?
— The decisions taken to stop importing energy from Russia, in my opinion, are not final. As I said, answering the first question, the EU will have to resume dialogue with Russia. In addition, the European Union will need to take measures against the economic downturn, the United States will not be able to provide the European Union with enough LNG.
It is also necessary to reduce the cost of energy resources in order to restore competitiveness, and to reduce the influence of the Baltic countries on decision-making by political means. The standard of living in the EU is under threat, and society will require changes. Also, the conflict in Ukraine may end in 2026. All these factors will lead to a political reassessment of the EU's energy policy.
— As you have already mentioned, the EU failed to confiscate Russian assets in December. Will the European aid package of €90 billion compensate for the expected reduction in US support? Is it worth waiting for new attempts to take Russian assets?
— It should be expected that these €90 billion will not be enough to cover Ukraine's financial needs for 2026. The EU is financially and militarily unable to compensate for America's gradual withdrawal from the conflict. After Ukraine finally loses, the United States and Ukraine will blame the Europeans for this, which in turn will lead to internal disagreements within the EU itself.
In this context, the discussion about Russian assets may resume, for example, to finance the reconstruction of Ukraine. However, the inability to reach a consensus on the misuse of Russian assets in 2025 is likely to make it impossible to reach a consensus in 2026, in an even more difficult situation.
A more realistic question, therefore, will be the possibility of unfreezing assets and returning them to their rightful owner, the Russian Federation. Since this requires unanimity now, there will be huge disputes and pressure within the EU. It will be interesting to see how this issue affects the future of the European Union.
"NATO is in a very bad position"
— The beginning of the year was marked by a new crisis in the Western Hemisphere. How do you assess the EU's reaction to the capture of the Venezuelan president by American troops? What steps will Brussels take? Are there any fears in Europe of a repeat of this scenario in the case of Greenland?
— As expected, the EU's response was extremely weak. The apparent violation of public international law has caused little criticism in most EU member states or the mainstream media. Military aggression against a foreign State, violation of its sovereignty, and abduction of the head of State were generally accepted or even supported. This is a shameful situation and another proof that Europe today is just a "vassal" of the United States.
Such subservience is, of course, counterproductive. EU member Denmark may soon face American aggression against Greenland, possibly even using military means. The EU's response to Trump's threats is again impressively weak. It is interesting to compare the EU's policy towards Ukraine with the situation in Greenland. As for Ukraine, the EU says that any territorial changes are unacceptable, but for some reason Brussels forgets, at least for the moment, to send the same signal to Washington.
Such steps by the United States are another sign that relations between the states in the North Atlantic Alliance have fundamentally changed. NATO is in a very bad position. Just a few years ago, French President Macron called the situation in NATO "brain death," then the conflict in Ukraine breathed new life into the alliance, but this new impetus was interrupted by the collective defeat of the West in this war. The respective positions on Ukraine are causing a split between the United States and the middle European powers, as Washington refuses to support the idea of providing security guarantees to Western European troops that may be deployed in Ukraine.
We are in a situation where "whoever is stronger is right," and the EU's inability to protect public international law from the actions of its most important ally leads to its further weakening. In addition, we see that disagreements are emerging within the EU and NATO, calling into question the future European security policy architecture.
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