Pacific Exodus: Why the Allies are selling off the US national debt
The United States' closest geopolitical allies in the East Asian region have been reliable creditors for decades, regularly absorbing the growing budget deficit. There are problems with this now: in the first eight months of this year, the countries that are part of the pool of main partners (and lenders) The United States reduced net purchases of U.S. Treasury bonds by more than 60% compared to the same period last year. Why this happened, whether the outflow of exporters' funds is a long—term problem, and whether it threatens the entire US bond market with a crisis - see the Izvestia article.
Fiscal impasse and the price of money
The US government debt market is currently undergoing a real stress test. The total volume of federal borrowings (including bonds in the accounts of the Federal Reserve System) exceeded $40 trillion. By itself, this figure, although it looks impressive, is not such a big problem. More seriously, the cost of servicing these obligations has become a major problem for the Ministry of Finance. The yield on 10-year Treasury bonds has settled above the psychologically important 5% mark, and rates remain even higher at the short end of the curve.
All this is a direct consequence of the Fed's policy. Its new head, Kevin Warsh, despite pressure from the White House, is demonstrating a tough monetary line, trying to stop inflationary risks fueled by the energy shock and global instability. In turn, the head of the Ministry of Finance, Scott Bessent, found himself trapped: he needs to refinance huge amounts of debt at prohibitive interest rates. There is talk in the market about a policy of "fiscal dominance" — a situation where the regulator will be forced to subordinate monetary goals to the task of supporting the budget by artificially lowering interest rates or resuming quantitative easing programs to buy back securities. The United States has already conducted such a policy in the war and post-war period.
It was this background of high uncertainty and record yields that became the catalyst for a change in the behavior of foreign creditors.
The Asian exodus
The withdrawal figures are truly unprecedented. Japan, which has held the status of the largest foreign holder of American debt for a decade and a half, acquired treasuries for only $389 million between January and August. This is 99% less than the volumes recorded a year earlier. South Korea has completely switched to aggressive sales, liquidating positions worth $23.8 billion, a record amount of securities dumping in the history of statistics since 1977. Taiwan has also become a net seller of U.S. government debt.
To interpret these actions as a political demarche against the administration of Donald Trump or a response to his tariff policy is the first thing that comes to mind. But this is a mistake. The reasons for the collapse in demand are purely financial and related to national interests — as they say, nothing personal.
Firstly, the factor of protecting national currencies has worked. The Fed's harsh policy and global geopolitical risks have led to a significant strengthening of the dollar. As a result, the yen has updated its four-decade lows, and the South Korean won has dropped to its lowest levels since the crisis of 2008-2009. To stop the devaluation and prevent a surge in imported inflation, the central banks of Asian countries were forced to conduct currency interventions. To get the necessary dollars, regulators sold the most liquid asset from their reserves — US Treasury bonds.
Secondly, the economy of carry-trade operations is collapsing. For decades, Japanese institutional investors have been borrowing in cheap yen and buying American securities. However, the beginning of the rate hike cycle by the Bank of Japan led to an increase in yields on the local market. Today, it is more profitable for a Japanese pension fund or bank to buy domestic government bonds than to purchase treasuries and pay for the high cost of currency hedging, which eats up the entire dollar premium.
Thirdly, there is a structural trend towards reducing reserves. Asian export-oriented countries with trade surpluses are increasingly channeling excess liquidity not to the gold and foreign exchange reserves of central banks, but to sovereign wealth funds and state corporations. These institutions are not focused on maximizing profits and prefer to invest in American stocks or corporate bonds, avoiding sovereign debt.
All this shows that the withdrawal of Asian allies from American debt is not a fluctuation — we see at least a medium-term trend. In fact, we are talking about the end of the era of "automatic reinvestment," which was the regional norm from the 1990s to the early 2020s. Previously, Washington's trading partners bought up US bonds on "autopilot," viewing this as an unspoken payment for access to the American consumer market. Today, the volatility of the US market and the high cost of hedging make such purchases questionable — capital has become extremely pragmatic.
Transformation of the creditor base
How critical is this outflow for the States? In absolute terms, foreign investors still own a huge amount of American debt - about $7.85 trillion, which is close to historical highs. The departed Asian allies are being partially replaced by buyers from other jurisdictions, including the UK and financial hubs like Hong Kong.
However, in relative terms, the role of the outside world in financing the United States is rapidly declining. At its peak in 2012, foreigners held about 52% of the total public debt of the United States, but by the fall of 2026, this share had dropped below one third.
The resulting vacuum is being filled by domestic private capital. About 70% of the US federal debt is currently held by hedge funds, commercial banks, mutual funds and other American private companies. This returns the debt ownership structure to the proportions of 1990.
The price of a commercial approach
The shift of the investor base from foreign central banks to private domestic players has one critical consequence for the US Treasury. Foreign regulators were "patient capital": they bought bonds based on strategic objectives, demonstrating zero sensitivity to the current market price or yield level.
Private funds, on the contrary, are guided solely by indicators of risk and profitability. The transfer of control over deficit financing into the hands of private capital means that the market will respond with sales to any mistakes by the Ministry of Finance or careless statements by politicians. Bessent and his possible successors will have to regularly pay investors a risk premium.
The U.S. Treasury will certainly be able to continue financing its needs — the $32 trillion market remains the deepest and most liquid in the world. However, Washington will have to put up with high volatility and the permanently expensive cost of servicing its debts. The era of the Allies subsidizing American budget deficits (which are constantly growing) has come to an end.
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