Back to the 1990s: why the new Asian crisis is dangerous for Russia
South Korea's financial system is in a fever — the stock market is experiencing one of the deepest recessions in recent years. The KOSPI index, which recently updated its highs on a wave of optimism about artificial intelligence, broke into a free fall. Having lost more than 3.5% at the opening on Tuesday alone, the indicator sank by almost 40% from its historical peaks, as a result of which hundreds of billions of dollars of market capitalization disappeared. Analysts and journalists began to recall the Asian crisis of 1997, which had devastating consequences for the entire global economy. Whether the catastrophe of the late 1990s will be repeated in East Asia and what risks really exist for the region, in which Russia is an active player, is in the Izvestia article.
A decline of hundreds of billions
The collapse on the Seoul Stock Exchange, which became the largest this year among all global indices (about $750 billion in capitalization was lost in the last two weeks alone), was caused by several reasons, both local and global in origin. The main vulnerability factor is over—concentration of the index. About half of the total KOSPI weight is accounted for by shares of Samsung Electronics and SK Hynix. These memory chip manufacturers have been the main beneficiaries of the artificial intelligence (AI) boom. Any profit-taking or deterioration of forecasts in these securities automatically pulls the entire national index to the bottom.
In the summer of this year, optimism about the endless growth of AI revenues has waned. In the United States, doubts have arisen about the return on hundreds of billions of dollars of investments in the construction of data centers and the purchase of servers. The slowdown in the pace of deployment of the new infrastructure immediately hit sales forecasts for high-bandwidth memory chips, which SK Hynix specializes in. The company expected that revenue would grow exponentially, but now it is clear that these calculations were not justified.
The pressure on Korean chip manufacturers is being compounded by increasing global competition. Chinese manufacturers, in particular CXMT, are entering the memory chip market. With various forms of government support in their arsenal, Chinese companies are ready to dump, which calls into question the long-term preservation of the ultra-high marginality of Korean corporations.
The decline in quotations provoked a domino effect among private investors. The rapid growth in the first half of the year was accompanied by a record inflow of retail capital to the stock exchange using leverage. The decline in the share price triggered a wave of margin calls, and the market could not withstand the enormous overhang of supply. A huge number of investors went bankrupt, as a result of which South Korean President Lee Jae-myung even addressed the nation, urging retail players who had lost all their money to continue living, "no matter what happens."
At the same time, the external situation was far from helping the Korean market. Higher-than-expected inflation in the United States has bolstered confidence that the Federal Reserve and other global central banks will keep interest rates at a tight level for longer than planned. An expensive dollar and high rates for East Asian markets and technology companies could hardly be useful.
The problems are deeper
The stock market crash is taking place against the background of general turmoil in the South Korean economy. The country is a leader among the countries of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development in terms of household debt. The ratio of the population's debt to GDP exceeds 100%. The decline in quotations has "eaten up" a significant part of the savings of the middle class. Combined with the rather high (3% above the inflation rate) base rate of the Bank of Korea, all this harms consumption.
Nevertheless, exports remain the mainstay of the national economy. However, given that semiconductors form a significant part of supplies abroad (about 20% of the total volume), the correction in this sector leads to a slowdown in the entire economy. The decline in export earnings and the contraction in domestic demand guarantee a slowdown in the country's GDP growth in the coming quarters.
The simultaneous drop in indices in Korea, Japan (by 8% in the last two weeks) and the countries of Southeast Asia makes analysts recall the Asian financial crisis of 1997. Then local problems turned into sovereign defaults, the collapse of banking systems, and emergency intervention by the IMF. The consequences were felt for a long time around the world — the Russian default of 1998 was among such effects.
But now the reality has changed. The trigger of the collapse in 1997 was the collapse of fixed exchange rates and the lack of dollars to pay foreign debts. Modern Asian economies operate with floating exchange rates, have huge gold and foreign exchange reserves and developed domestic debt markets. In this regard, there should be no repeat of the crisis.
The threat is quite serious, but it exists. Instead of massive national bankruptcies, there may be a simultaneous squeeze of liquidity, disruption of investment cycles and a slowdown in economic growth throughout almost the most important manufacturing part of the world. Moreover, each of the key economies of the region contributes to a possible crisis.
Many fronts
In the modern world, Japan is not a victim, but a generator of global instability. As the world's largest international lender, Tokyo has launched the process of curtailing the yen carry trade by raising the base rate of the Central Bank. For decades, investors have been taking cheap yen and buying profitable assets around the world, from stocks of Korean chip manufacturers to American bonds. Now investors are closing positions and returning to the Japanese Islands. The withdrawal of this cheap liquidity provokes collapses on Asian stock exchanges, even if the fundamental indicators of companies remain stable (and this is far from all right).
The developing economies of the ASEAN bloc, primarily Indonesia, are under pressure from the strong dollar and the commodity downturn. The Central Bank of the republic is forced to spend reserves and keep interest rates high to protect the rupee, which stifles business lending. The country's economy, which depends on exports of coal, palm oil and nickel, is suffering from falling demand. However, the margin of safety of state finances in the country is high: Jakarta's gold and foreign exchange reserves amount to about $140-150 billion, and the share of foreigners in sovereign debt has decreased from 40% in previous crises to less than 15%, which excludes a stampede of external capital.
China remains the main factor in the regional slowdown. The domestic real estate crisis and weak consumer confidence in China have brought down import demand. Japan is losing orders for machine tools, Indonesia is reducing metal supplies, and Korea is losing the electronics market. In an attempt to offset the downturn, Beijing is redirecting overproduction to exports, dumping prices on everything from chips to electric vehicles. The export of Chinese deflation undermines the profitability of corporations in neighboring countries.
Risks for Russia
For Russia, the economic slowdown in the Asia-Pacific region is bad news. In the context of the reorientation of trade flows, Asian countries have become the main buyers of Russian energy resources and metals.
South Korea, despite the (rather tepid) support of Western sanctions, remains a major consumer of Russian energy resources. The basis of this cooperation is the supply of liquefied natural gas (LNG), primarily from Sakhalin projects. Historically, the Russian resource accounts for about 5-6% of the total gas imports of the Republic of Korea. In absolute terms, this amounts to around 2-2.5 million tons of LNG per year, which brings Russian producers billions of dollars in foreign exchange earnings. Additionally, Seoul continues to purchase Russian coal and specific grades of oil through traders.
The contraction of the South Korean economy caused by the crisis in the semiconductor sector will inevitably lead to a decrease in industrial energy consumption. Slowing down the plants will reduce the need for gas for basic generation. With the global LNG market experiencing price shocks due to instability in the Middle East, Asian consumers will strive to maximize savings.
Synchronous stagnation in South Korea, Japan, and China means lower demand for coal, metals, and hydrocarbons. For the Russian budget, which is balanced with the expectation of stable commodity revenues, the cooling of Asian economies threatens to reduce export prices and drop shipments. The Asian stock market crash translates into a decrease in tax revenues to the Russian treasury, proving that the isolation of national economies from global industrial cycles is impossible.
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