Strategic chance: what will lower gas production in China give Russia?
The Chinese mining industry was surprised in the first half of 2026: for the first time in two decades of continuous expansion, domestic natural gas production in China did not show growth, remaining at the level of last year. Such stagnation looks like an anomaly, especially in conditions when Beijing needs cheap domestic resources to replace imported LNG, which is becoming more expensive due to the Middle East crisis. What China's gas industry looks like today, why the growth of domestic production has stopped right now and what prospects this opens up for Russian exporters — in the Izvestia article.
The heyday period
When people say that China is a net importer of gas, they often forget that this country is also one of the largest producers in the world. If we look at the development of the situation with the Chinese gas sector since the beginning of the century, Beijing's strategy assumed that its own production should be a reliable foundation for energy security. And the growth during this time has really been impressive — almost threefold. However, the appetite of the Chinese economy grew faster than the number and productivity of drilling rigs. From 2010 to 2024, China's gas consumption increased fourfold, from 107 billion cubic meters to 428 billion cubic meters. The average annual growth rate of demand (CAGR) exceeded 10.4%. At the same time, our own production, despite titanic efforts, increased only 2.6 times (from 95 to 246 billion cubic meters), showing an average annual growth of 7%.
The gap formed abruptly. It was especially acute in 2017-2021 during the state campaign "Fight for a Clear Sky", when millions of coal-fired boilers were converted to gas. Consumption in that period soared by 13-18% per year, while production added more than 7-9%. It was then that the share of imports in the national gas balance crossed the 40% mark forever. Production outstripped demand only twice: during the economic slowdown in 2015 and in the covid 2022, when lockdowns triggered the first 1.2% reduction in consumption in two decades.
By 2025, domestic production will reach about 255-258 billion cubic meters, providing the country with a powerful base and an airbag in case of problems in foreign markets. Ironically, it was during these problems that difficulties arose with the growth of production.
Its shutdown this year has two layers of reasons — opportunistic and fundamental. The first ones arose under the influence of large-scale repair campaigns. State-owned companies were forced to carry out both scheduled maintenance and unscheduled infrastructure shutdowns at key fields after years of wear and tear (for example, on the CNOOC platform in the South China Sea). Logistical bottlenecks — a shortage of underground gas storage facilities (UGS) and insufficient pipe capacity from west to east — also forced production restrictions during periods of seasonal consumption declines.
The Other Shale Revolution
But this is just the tip of the iceberg, and there are much deeper reasons for stagnation. The traditional, easily recoverable reserves in the Ordos, Sichuan and Tarim basins have been largely exhausted. The natural drop in the flow rate of old wells requires the drilling of an increasing number of new facilities just to keep the total production shelf at the same level.
The volume increase in recent years has been driven by hard-to-recover reserves: shale, dense sandstones, and the deep-sea shelf. China also had its own shale revolution, but it is noticeably different from the American one. The formations in Sichuan lie at depths of 3500-5000 m (in the USA — 1500-2500 m), are characterized by extreme temperatures and pressures, and the difficult mountainous terrain sharply increases the cost of logistics. The main difficulty is the rapid drop in the flow rate: the initial inflow from Chinese shale wells decreases by 60-70% in the first year.
The cost of such drilling is prohibitive, while the National Development and Reform Commission (NDRC) tightly regulates domestic wholesale tariffs in order to support the industry. Against the background of a reduction in government subsidies for state-owned companies, further expansion of unprofitable production has lost its meaning. Moreover, the expansion of renewable energy sources (solar and wind are introduced at a rate of 200-300 GW per year) and the electrification of transport somewhat smooth out the peak demand for gas in generation.
Window of opportunity
If the ceiling on domestic production in China is reached, it may affect the country's negotiating position in the Eurasian gas market. For Beijing, the task of covering the remaining 40% of demand (about 180-200 billion cubic meters per year) now requires balancing pipeline imports with liquefied natural gas (LNG).
This year, the global LNG market has been shaken by the closure of the Strait of Hormuz and the destruction of a number of capacities, which has inflated prices and made maritime supplies vulnerable. This may create a window of opportunity for Russia.
Firstly, the Power of Siberia–1 highway has reached its design capacity of 38 billion cubic meters. Pipeline gas from the Russian Federation, linked to an oil-indexed formula, turns out to be economically more predictable and safer for China than spot LNG. The route's geopolitical security is its most important value.
Secondly, the stagnation of Chinese production is the main argument for accelerating the implementation of the Power of Siberia–2 project. Beijing, which has traditionally dragged its feet in negotiations hoping for its own shale and cheap Turkmen gas, may realize that it will be extremely expensive to cover the long-term shortage in the industry of the northern and northeastern provinces. Finally, prospects are opening up for Russian Arctic LNG. Novatek's projects, which supply gas via the Northern Sea Route, have the shortest delivery shoulder to the east coast of China, bypassing the conflict zones of the Indian Ocean.
Nevertheless, Russian exporters are unlikely to be given a red carpet. China will by no means abandon its diversification strategy. Russia will compete for market share with Turkmenistan, which is promoting the construction of Line D, as well as with the future volumes of American and Qatari LNG that will flood the market after the end of the Middle East crisis and the commissioning of new plants.
Extensive growth at the expense of its own resources is highly likely to be exhausted for China. It can be resumed, but it is unlikely to return to peak levels, while the needs of the giant economy will continue to increase regardless of the level of development of the same renewable energy sources. For Moscow, the ability to offer flexible pricing conditions and the willingness to invest in joint logistics will be a decisive factor in the struggle for the status of the main gas donor (and tens, if not hundreds of billions of dollars in revenue) for the first/second world economy in the coming decades.
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