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Exactly 85 years ago, on September 30, 1941, one of the key battles of the Great Patriotic War began — the Battle for Moscow. Realizing the failure of the lightning war strategy, the German command concentrated enormous forces to capture the capital. But Soviet troops and ordinary citizens came to her defense, turning the city into an impregnable fortress. About how the Wehrmacht offensive failed, how the parade on November 7, 1941 took place, and about the significance of the Battle for Moscow, see the Izvestia article.

How the German command planned to destroy Moscow: Operation Typhoon

After the blitzkrieg plan, which implied a lightning seizure of the western part of the Soviet Union, failed, the German command decided to focus on capturing the capital of the USSR. On September 6, 1941, Hitler signed Directive No. 35, and on September 19, the operation was named Typhoon.

The plan was as follows: with powerful strikes by three tank groups from the Dukhovshchina, Roslavl and Shostka regions, dissect the defenses of the Soviet troops, surround and destroy the main forces of the Red Army in the Bryansk and Vyazma regions, and then bypass Moscow from the north and south and take the city in a "pincer". The commander of Army Group Center was Fyodor von Bock, supported by the 2nd Air Fleet.

Противотанковые заграждения под Москвой
Photo: RIA Novosti/Sergey Kosyrev

The Germans have concentrated an impressive force in the Moscow area: about 1.8 million people, over 14 thousand guns and mortars, about 1.7 thousand tanks, and about 1.4 thousand aircraft. They were opposed by the forces of three Soviet fronts — the Western, Reserve and Bryansk fronts with a total strength of about 1.25 million people, about 7.6 thousand guns and mortars, 990 tanks and 677 aircraft.

The offensive began on September 30, 1941. First, General Heinz Guderian's 2nd Panzer Group struck in the Bryansk direction, and on October 2, the remaining groups went on the offensive in the Vyazma direction. In the early days, the Germans managed to achieve success: they broke through the defenses of the Bryansk front, captured Orel. This opened up the operational scope for the Germans to attack Moscow. However, the pace of the offensive dropped sharply.

"The bet was to first defeat the forces that would defend Moscow in the "cauldrons" and then enter the city "with a harmonica", because after the destruction of Soviet troops on the distant approaches to Moscow, no gigantic forces and fresh lines of defense were expected. The calculation did not work out for a very trivial reason: the Russians had much more prepared reserves than the enemy thought, and new ones were arriving. Our forces were strong enough, and the measures taken in this area were energetic enough to quickly build new frontiers on the approaches to Moscow," said Evgeny Norin, a military historian, writer, and author of books on military conflicts of the 20th century.

Пришла новая боевая техника
Photo: RIA Novosti/Alexander Mokletsov

At the same time, the Germans' goals in relation to Moscow were much more terrible than just a seizure.

"There is evidence in this regard from Franz Halder, Chief of the General Staff of the Army. "The Fuhrer's decision to raze Moscow and Leningrad to the ground is unshakeable." The city was doomed to destruction. The Nazis proceeded from their plans, which assumed a radical reduction of the population in this territory, which they considered as their living space, so that Moscow would become a dead city," explained Evgeny Norin.

The Vyazma disaster: why Soviet troops were surrounded

The term "Vyazma catastrophe" is used to describe the events of October 1941. On October 2, the German troops of Army Group Center launched an offensive and, with strikes from the areas of Dukhovshchina and Roslavl, broke through the Soviet defenses, and then closed the encirclement ring west of Vyazma. On October 7, the Wehrmacht tank groups joined forces, and units of the 16th, 19th, 20th, 24th, and 32nd armies, as well as the group of General Ivan Boldin, fell into the "cauldron".

The encircled Soviet troops did not surrender immediately: from October 7 to October 13, they fought heavy battles, pinning down large enemy forces (according to various estimates, up to 28 German divisions). Attempts were made to break through, but due to the acute shortage of tanks, artillery, ammunition and medicines, it was not possible to achieve large‑scale success. Some of the troops were able to fight their way out of the encirclement and join the defense on the Mozhaisk line, while others joined the partisan detachments.

Ржевско-Вяземская стратегическая наступательная операция
Photo: RIA Novosti/Leonid Dorensky

Historians identify several key reasons for the Vyazma disaster: after the Battle of Smolensk, the troops occupied a very wide front (more than 300 km), the defense line was focal in nature and was poorly prepared in engineering terms. At that moment, the Soviet command did not focus on creating a solid, deeply entrenched defense, but on continuous counterattacks by large masses of troops, and this led to heavy losses and rapid depletion of reserves. The German command created a significant superiority in the directions of the main attacks, and the enemy's reconnaissance and sabotage groups actively disrupted communications and disorganized control in the rear of the Soviet troops.

The losses, according to experts, turned out to be enormous: irretrievable losses are estimated at about 1 million people, about 663 thousand people were captured (both near Vyazma and near Bryansk). About 6 thousand guns and mortars, over 1,2 thousand tanks were lost. As a result, a huge "operational gap" was created in the Moscow direction, and the path to the capital was temporarily opened to the Germans. There was even a panic in Moscow, and a state of siege was imposed.

Despite the scale of the defeat, the resistance of the encircled troops played a strategic role: while heavy fighting was taking place in the "cauldron", the Soviet command managed to pull up reserves, including cadets from military schools, as well as fresh divisions.

Советские артиллеристы-разведчики
Photo: RIA Novosti/Vladimir Minkevich

"Throughout the summer and autumn, the Red Army intensively formed new divisions, fresh ones, right in the course of the ongoing hostilities. It was these offspring of what was called permanent mobilization that helped stop the German groups. The enemy did not reveal the mass formation of fresh forces," explained Evgeny Norin.

This made it possible to organize defense on new frontiers and eventually disrupt the rapid offensive against Moscow.

Explaining the reasons for the encirclement, the historian noted that at the end of September-October, the Soviet troops had a lot of infantry, but all the mechanized corps burned out in the summer battles and were disbanded. In order to fend off the attacks of large tank forces, you need your own large tank forces, but there were none and there was nowhere to take them.

"Three tank groups out of four that the Germans had were advancing on Moscow," said Evgeny Norin.

Barricades, militia, and fortification construction

While the encircled units were being held down by large enemy forces in the "cauldron" near Vyazma and Bryansk, another line of defense was unfolding in Moscow itself — the urban one. In October 1941, the threat of a breakthrough to the capital became real, and not only regular units, but also Muscovites themselves stood up to defend the city — they massively erected barricades, joined the militia and participated in the construction of fortifications.

Жители Москвы роют противотанковый ров
Photo: IZVESTIA/Dmitry Baltermants

Residents blocked the streets with two types of barricades: some on a prefabricated metal frame lined with sacks of earth and sand (they were stronger), others easier to construct and disassemble. The barricades created support points of resistance: they were positioned so as to cover key highways and tank-hazardous areas with fire. As a result, about 10 km of such barriers were erected in the city.

Since July 1941, divisions of the people's militia have been formed in Moscow. People from a wide variety of professions signed up for them: workers, intellectuals, students, representatives of creative professions (there was even a "writer's company" and divisions of employees from universities and enterprises). In just a few days, 12 divisions were formed, and several more were created in the fall. At first, the militia was planned to be used for engineering tasks, rear protection and anti—amphibious operations, but at a critical moment the divisions were thrown to the front line to close gaps in the defense and gain time to pull up regular units.

In parallel, large-scale fortification construction began. On October 12, 1941, the State Defense Committee (GKO) decided to create the Moscow Defense Zone — a system of three frontiers: the outer (on distant approaches), the main (15-20 km from the center) and the urban. Hundreds of thousands of Muscovites participated in the work, about 75% of them were women. People dug anti-tank ditches, built escarpments, erected pillboxes and bunkers, installed wire barriers, mined approaches, and created forest blockages. In total, 676 km of anti-tank trenches were built, 24 thousand anti-tank hedgehogs, about 10 km of barricades and other structures.

Жители города строят противотанковые укрепления
Photo: RIA Novosti/Alexander Ustinov

"First of all, a prepared defensive line is very important, especially when you need to occupy it quickly and quickly start preparing to repel attacks. Secondly, the People's militia turned out to be very important precisely as infantry divisions, which were sorely lacking at that moment. And the militias were already formations that could influence the operational situation. Due to the voluntary nature of the militia divisions, these were formations with a higher level of motivation — people who deliberately chose such a fate," the historian explained.

All these measures have become part of the overall defense system. They helped to delay the enemy, gain time to pull up reserves and eventually thwart the plan to capture Moscow.

November 7, 1941 parade: Moscow showed that it continues to resist

While barricades were being reinforced and built in the city, the command made another landmark decision — to hold a parade on November 7. With the front line running several dozen kilometers from Moscow, the parade was not just a military measure, but a powerful political signal that the city was not giving up.

Preparations for the parade were conducted in the strictest secrecy: in official correspondence, the event was designated as an "operation of the Moscow garrison troops." Until recently, most of the participants did not know what event they were being prepared for.

Военный парад на Красной площади в Москве 7 ноября 1941 года
Photo: RIA Novosti/Arkady Shaikhet

Serious security measures were taken: the monuments were protected with wooden shields and sandbags, the Mausoleum was camouflaged, and a blackout was introduced. Over 500 fighters were deployed from the front to protect the sky. Even before the parade, the Soviet Air Force launched preemptive strikes on German airfields — as a result, not a single enemy aircraft broke through to the square. Due to heavy snowfall and blizzard, the aerial part had to be canceled.

The parade was commanded by Lieutenant General Pavel Artemyev and hosted by Marshal Semyon Budyonny. Joseph Stalin and other leaders of the country were on the podium of the mausoleum. About 28,500 people, 140 artillery pieces, 160 tanks, and 232 vehicles participated in the parade.

In his speech, Stalin stressed that the main goals of the German Operation Typhoon had not been achieved — the Nazis had failed to take Moscow with a rapid offensive. He addressed the memory of great ancestors and spoke about the liberation mission of the Soviet people.

"On November 7, of course, there was no threat that the enemy would break into the city right now. The units participating in the parade immediately went to the front line. And naturally, the main effect of such a parade is psychological. He showed that the political leadership is not running away. The situation is under control, and there are troops, we will fight," said Evgeny Norin.

Маршевые роты отправляются на фронт по улице Горького в Москве
Photo: RIA Novosti/Olga Ignatovich

The very fact of holding the parade in such conditions was a powerful signal: the capital is not giving up.

How the Soviet troops stopped the Wehrmacht offensive

The Soviet troops managed to stop the Wehrmacht's offensive near Moscow not due to any one factor, but as a result of a complex combination of circumstances ‑ stubborn defense, competent command decisions, the transfer of reserves and the fact that the enemy eventually ran out of resources.

The Mozhaisk line of defense became the key frontier. Heavy fighting took place in the areas of Volokolamsk, Maloyaroslavets and Tula. After the breakthrough of the front in the area of Vyazma and Bryansk, the encircled Soviet armies did not surrender, but continued to fight. The active defense inflicted significant losses on the Wehrmacht and significantly reduced the pace of the offensive.

Engineering tricks were used: sappers undermined locks and dams (for example, at the Istra reservoir) in order to flood floodplains and hinder the advance of enemy equipment.

"Fortifications, even unfinished ones, are still useful. It must be understood that fortifications by themselves do not win the war. They provide certain modifiers to the effectiveness of the defense of the formations that occupy them. For example, the Ilyinsky line and the Podolsk cadets who stood on it are widely known: they defended themselves using semi-ready fortifications, bunkers, pillboxes, and all this enhanced the effectiveness of the defense, that is, there are no examples when the fortifications themselves stopped the enemy. But there are situations when they had a very serious impact on his progress: German tanks were blown up by mines, stopped for a number of hours before the blown-up crossings. All this added such military friction to the graceful maneuvers of the Wehrmacht," the historian emphasized.

Разбитый во время битвы за Москву немецкий танк
Photo: IZVESTIA/Samari Gurari

Formations from other regions were urgently deployed to the capital. Fresh, well-equipped and warmly dressed divisions became the very resource that allowed not just to hold the line, but to launch a counterattack at the right moment.

The Soviet command was closely monitoring the situation. The Germans did not have a prepared defense on the captured borders, operational reserves were exhausted, and communications were severely stretched.

"The main factors were the active and very intense resistance of the Red Army, the transfer of reserves accumulated in advance, the formation of fresh divisions and, consequently, the depletion of Wehrmacht forces on the opposite side, because the Germans marched in this formation almost from the border. Naturally, the divisions were no longer in the same condition as they were in the summer," the expert explained.

The Red Army's Counteroffensive

The official date of the beginning of the counteroffensive is December 5, 1941. The troops of the Kalinin Front under the command of Colonel‑General Ivan Konev were the first to attack. On December 6‑ they were joined by the forces of the Western Front (commander — Army General Georgy Zhukov) and the Southwestern Front (commander — Marshal Sergei Timoshenko). The offensive unfolded on a wide front — from Kalinin (modern times). Tver) to Yelets.

Командующий артиллерией РККА
Photo: RIA Novosti/Sergey Loskutov

Soviet troops attacked the flanks and the most vulnerable areas of the enemy group, trying to weaken the enemy's defenses and deprive him of maneuverability. On December 7, the 16th Army under the command of Konstantin Rokossovsky liberated Istra, Klin was taken on December 15, Kalinin on December 16, Volokolamsk on December 20, Naro—Fominsk on December 26. To the south, Soviet units liberated Yelets, Mikhailov, Kaluga, Belev and removed the threat to Tula, effectively unblocking the city.

The Soviet command had been preparing for a counteroffensive since November. The most important element of the plan was the covert transfer of fresh reserves, including divisions from the Far East, Siberia and other rear regions. The secrecy of the operation made it possible to preserve the surprise factor: the German command still believed that the USSR did not have sufficient forces for a large‑scale strike.

By early December, the Wehrmacht's offensive potential had finally dried up. The enemy's material and human reserves have been depleted, supply lines have stretched excessively, and morale has noticeably decreased in some parts. An additional complicating factor was the severe frosts of early December, for which German equipment and personnel were poorly prepared. At the same time, historians emphasize that the crisis of the German offensive came even before the extreme cold weather — it was caused by a combination of operational and logistical problems.

Обломки сбитого немецкого бомбардировщика
Photo: RIA Novosti/S. Korshunov

"It was clear that the enemy was running out of steam, it was clear that we had managed to stop his offensive, and at that moment we were putting trumps on the table. Here it must be understood that due to the fact that the Wehrmacht tried very diligently and for a long time to get to Moscow, they were "soft" at that moment. On the one hand, in the infantry divisions they already had a very serious drawdown in combat strength — in the sense of those people who go into battle with rifles and machine guns in their hands. In this sense, the Wehrmacht was greatly weakened. In addition, the Germans had accumulated a huge amount of equipment with damage, albeit non—critical, but it took time and spare parts to fix them. They have already used up a significant portion of the fuel. And when the counteroffensive began and the Wehrmacht rolled away from Moscow, all this stuff had to be abandoned: even a small breakdown required waiting for spare parts, but there was no time — the Russians were on their way. Hence the very debris of abandoned vehicles that fixed all sides: a huge number of abandoned not only auxiliary, but also combat vehicles. Emergency equipment assembly points, parking lots, and artillery were captured, so the moment for launching an attack was chosen exceptionally well," said Evgeny Norin.

By January 7, 1942, German troops had been driven back 100-250 km from Moscow. The immediate threat to the capital has been eliminated. During the counteroffensive, Soviet units liberated the Moscow region, a significant part of the Kalinin Region, as well as a number of districts of the Smolensk and Orel regions. In total, more than 11 thousand settlements were liberated. The enemy suffered serious losses in manpower and equipment.

Военная техника, брошенная немецкими войсками
Photo: IZVESTIA/Pavel Troshkin

On December 8, 1941, Hitler was forced to sign Directive No. 39, which ordered German troops to go on the defensive along the entire front.

Why the Battle for Moscow became one of the most important battles of the Great Patriotic War

The failure of Operation Typhoon and the successful Red Army counteroffensive effectively buried the blitzkrieg strategy. Many historians believe that it was from this moment that the fundamental turning point in the Great Patriotic War and in the Second World War as a whole began.

"The Battle for Moscow is considered the first strategic defeat of the Wehrmacht in the literal sense: the German ground forces had to retreat a significant distance on a wide front, abandoning equipment, losing people and vehicles in small "boilers". We even have a case of suicide of a German general in the environment. This highlights the scale and severity of the crisis in the German units. It was a weighty, brutal and visible defeat of the Wehrmacht," stressed Evgeny Norin.

Moscow was the main political, industrial and transport hub of the country. Key management bodies, large factories were located here, and the most important railway lines converged. The fall of the capital could paralyze the government of the country and seriously undermine the military potential of the USSR, so the outcome of the battle was of great importance to both sides.

Производство авиабомб ФАБ-250 на заводе в Москве
Photo: RIA Novosti/Alexander Ustinov

The victory near Moscow destroyed the myth of the invincibility of the Wehrmacht. For Soviet soldiers and citizens, it became a powerful psychological incentive: people became convinced that the enemy could not only be stopped, but also pushed back. This strengthened the will to resist and contributed to the intensification of the guerrilla movement in the enemy's rear.

The success of the USSR in the Battle for Moscow had a significant impact on the international situation.

"This had a very good effect on the perception of the Soviet Union in the world, because all the experts at that time gave the USSR a maximum of three months. And then it became clear that we were not just holding on, we were fighting in earnest," the historian noted.

Переведено сервисом «Яндекс Переводчик»

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