Why loans are in no hurry to become cheaper after the Central Bank rate cut. Analysis
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- Why loans are in no hurry to become cheaper after the Central Bank rate cut. Analysis
The main thing in the material:
• The structural liquidity deficit of banks has grown to almost 2.9 trillion rubles, the highest since the spring of 2022. The main reason is the growing volume of cash outside the banking system.
• The Central Bank controls the situation in the money market: RUONIA is kept almost at the level of the key rate, the regulator closes the shortage of rubles through repo and other instruments.
• The reduction in the key rate is still slowly reaching final borrowers: in July, short—term loans to the public were issued at an average of 31.1%, long-term loans at 18.9%. At the same time, the space for further monetary policy easing is limited.
• A rate cut by itself does not guarantee the return of cheap money: fiscal momentum and inflationary expectations can keep market rates high, even if the central Bank continues its easing cycle.
• The high cost of capital is gradually becoming a filter for business: the Central Bank is already recording an increase in restructurings and a deterioration in the situation of individual over-indebted companies, although there is no systemic deterioration in the quality of corporate debt yet.
On September 11, the Bank of Russia will decide again what to do with the key rate — the continuation of the reduction cycle no longer looks like a foregone conclusion. Inflationary risks remain, lending volumes are growing, and fiscal policy remains stimulating. At the same time, the structural liquidity deficit in the banking system has grown to its highest levels since the spring of 2022. This does not mean that banks are running out of money. However, a rapid reduction in loan rates is still not worth waiting for. Izvestia investigated why the era of cheap money may not return soon.
There is a shortage, but not the same
The Russian banking system is facing a structural deficit of almost 2.9 trillion rubles (compared to 587 billion at the beginning of the year), which has not been seen since March 2022. Back in the spring, the Central Bank expected a structural deficit for the year in the range of 2.4–3.6 trillion rubles, but by the end of August it revised the forecast up to 4.6 trillion. In other words, the regulator already includes an increase in the indicator in its base scenario. It is important to understand that this is not about running out of money in the system, but about the fact that banks do not have enough free rubles for daily payments, and they have to attract additional liquidity from the Central Bank.
As of September 10, banks owed 5.7 trillion rubles to the Central Bank. Of these, about 4.5 trillion rubles were raised by banks through repo operations — loans secured by securities. At the same time, the banks themselves placed about 4 trillion rubles on deposits with the Central Bank. The figures do not contradict each other, since the banking system is heterogeneous: some banks have free money, while others need liquidity.
When calculating the structural deficit, the Central Bank takes into account all these operations, as well as bank funds on accounts and mandatory reserves.
The main reason for the growing need for funding for banks is the increase in the amount of cash outside the banking system. The figure increased from 19.4 trillion rubles at the beginning of the year to almost 22 trillion as of September 1 — the difference is approximately 2.4 trillion rubles. According to the forecast, at the end of the year, the volume of cash in the economy will grow to 23.1 trillion rubles. This is important for bank liquidity: when a customer withdraws money from an account, rubles do not disappear from the economy, but they transfer from a non-cash form to cash and exit the banking circuit.
At the same time, the increased demand for cash is not like a banking panic. Among the reasons, the Central Bank cited the unstable operation of electronic payment methods for purchases and the use of cash by the shadow economy. However, in general, the share of cash in the money supply is at the level of the beginning of 2025 — around 15% (five years ago it was about 20%).
There are no signs of mass withdrawals from bank accounts either: according to the latest data, in July the funds of the population in banks increased by 0.3%, companies — by 0.6%. And this fundamentally distinguishes the current situation from the spring of 2022. At that time, banks faced a large—scale outflow of public funds: in late February and early March, it reached 2.4 trillion rubles. Against this background, the structural liquidity deficit amounted to 7 trillion rubles, and the Central Bank provided banks with about 10 trillion rubles at its peak.
Since the Central Bank is now closing the gap, there is no need to talk about the onset of a banking crisis. The state of the money market is reflected by the RUONIA rate, which is the cost of one—day loans between banks. As of September 9, it stands at 13.95% with a key rate of 14%. This is precisely the operational goal of the Central Bank — the regulator either provides money to banks through repo and other instruments, or withdraws excess liquidity so that money market rates stay close to the key one. That is, in fact, the current structural deficit remains largely manageable by the state of the banking system.
At the same time, the Bank of Russia does not seek to create a shortage of rubles in order to combat inflation, nor to flood the banking system with cheap money. If there are too many rubles, the need for banks to borrow from each other will decrease, and money market rates will go down. In such a situation, monetary conditions may soften faster than the Central Bank wants, and the fight against inflation will become more difficult. If there are too few rubles, banks will start competing for them, overnight rates will go up, and as a result, conditions will turn out to be tougher than the rate set by the Central Bank suggests.
By regulating the amount of liquidity in the system, the Central Bank ensures that its market value corresponds to a given level. Then the key rate really works as a guideline for other rates in the economy, including loans for businesses and households.
Loans live at their own rates
At the same time, loan rates are not required to automatically move after the key rate. The Central Bank consistently reduces it, but other factors also affect the cost of a particular loan, including the loan term, the borrower's risk, and the cost of funding the bank. Thus, one of the main sources of funding — retail deposits — has recently stopped getting cheaper. This can be seen in the maximum rates on deposits of the largest banks. In the first decade of January, the indicator was 15.1%, by July it had decreased to 12.8%, but then it increased slightly. In August, it stood at about 12.9% (we discussed the behavior of deposit rates in detail here).
Against this background, the reaction of different segments of the credit market also remains heterogeneous. According to the latest data from the Central Bank, in July the average rate on short—term ruble corporate loans decreased by 0.3 percentage points to 16.8%, while long-term loans remained unchanged at 12.9%. For the population, the rates are much higher: short-term loans fell in price by only 0.1 percentage points, to 31.1%, while long-term loans, on the contrary, immediately increased by 1.4 percentage points, to 18.9%. In annual terms, retail loan rates remain higher than last year.
At the same time, it is impossible to say that high interest rates have stopped lending. In July, the portfolio of loans to legal entities and individual entrepreneurs grew by 1.6%, with an annual growth rate of 12.7%. The revival continues in retail. The consumer loan portfolio grew by 1.1% over the month, including due to cash loans. In annual terms, its growth accelerated to 2.5%.
This situation, in turn, makes the Central Bank more cautious about further rate cuts: new loans increase the ability of companies and the public to spend and invest, supporting domestic demand. If it grows faster than the supply of goods and services, this increases pressure on prices and makes it more difficult to control inflation.
Credit is not the only source of additional money in the economy. In July, the head of the Central Bank, Elvira Nabiullina, noted that the dynamics of lending is generally in line with the forecast, while the money supply (it has two main sources — credit and budget) is growing faster than expected due to higher budget expenditures. The more money that flows into the economy through the budget, the less room there is for expanding lending. Therefore, reducing the cost of credit too quickly can negate part of the effect of tight monetary policy.
At a meeting on September 11, the Bank of Russia will have to decide whether it is ready to lower the rate further — at a time when business is waiting for a quick reduction in the cost of credit. Now the space for further policy easing has become more limited — the forecast of the average key rate for the current year in July was raised from April 14-14.5% to 14.5–14.6%. This does not mean a mandatory increase in the Central Bank's rate, but indicates its tougher trajectory than previously expected.
There is likely to be a pause in the easing cycle now. This scenario is supported by a more stimulating than expected fiscal policy, accelerated corporate lending, and increased inflation expectations.
For borrowers, this means that a rapid reduction in the cost of loans is postponed. And even if the Central Bank resumes the key reduction cycle in the near future, this alone will not be enough to significantly reduce the cost of loans. In order for the market to hear the regulator's signal, it must be stable and long—lasting - only then will cheaper money reach banks and end borrowers. And how far the Central Bank can go in this cycle will depend primarily on inflation and domestic demand. If the regulator starts reducing the rate faster than inflationary conditions allow, the effect may be reversed: the market will place a higher premium on inflationary risk (this is clearly seen in the OFZ market).
Expensive money is starting to change the market
So far, the long period of high interest rates has not led to a noticeable deterioration in the quality of the corporate loan portfolio. The Central Bank assesses it as acceptable (despite the increase in overdue debt, its share in the portfolio has decreased to 3.6%) and notes that most companies remain profitable and consistently service debt. However, the regulator simultaneously records a deterioration in the financial situation of individual borrowers with a high debt burden, as well as an increase in restructurings.
For the most stable borrowers, the alternative to a bank loan is the bond market. In the second quarter, the volume of corporate bond market placements exceeded 2.2 trillion rubles, setting a new record, and in August, companies placed 116 issues worth 875 billion, the best result for this month in the history of observations. This does not mean that businesses have massively replaced bank loans with bonds, but it shows the demand for an alternative financing channel. At the same time, bonds also do not allow escaping the high cost of money: the price of new placements depends on market rates and the credit quality of the issuer.
But small and medium-sized businesses have less room for maneuver. In July, banks provided loans to SMEs for 1.3 trillion rubles, almost the same amount as a month earlier. At the same time, the Central Bank notes that the default rate in the SME segment has decreased slightly, partly due to the fact that in 2025-2026 banks tightened the quality requirements for such borrowers. However, they are more sensitive to expensive money. According to the Central Bank, in July, the average interest rate on short—term ruble loans to SMEs was 17.9%, and on long-term loans it was 14.7%. During the month, they decreased by only 0.1 and 0.4 percentage points, respectively. Therefore, even the next step of the Central Bank by 0.25 percentage points may be almost imperceptible for such a borrower.
For banks, the main risk is not a structural shortage of liquidity, but the ability of borrowers to service expensive debt. The longer the high rates remain, the more different companies with stable cash flow are from businesses that constantly need refinancing to service old obligations. Therefore, the next indicators of tension are the growth of restructurings and overdue debts — it is especially important to monitor the dynamics of these indicators now. They show whether the high cost of money is starting to turn from a problem for individual borrowers into a problem for bank balance sheets. So far, there has been no systemic deterioration in the situation — the pressure of high rates manifests itself pointwise, turning into a mechanism for selecting business models.
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