Icy compromise: South Korea is going to test the Northern Sea Route
South Korea intends to send a container ship from Busan to Europe via the Arctic, bypassing the Suez Canal and despite the displeasure of Brussels. The PanStar Acro test flight, which will take up to 45 days, should show the commercial feasibility of the route, but Seoul will inevitably have to cooperate with Moscow to implement it. While Western diplomats are demanding that Russia be isolated, South Korean businesses are counting profits. Details can be found in the Izvestia article.
From Asia to Europe
South Korea is going to test the Northern Sea Route (NSR) by sending a container ship from Busan to Europe via the Arctic, reports Reuters. According to the agency, the pilot flight should demonstrate how feasible this route is from a commercial point of view.
On August 22, the PanStar Acro container ship will sail along the route, calling at Felixstowe in Britain, Rotterdam in the Netherlands and Gdansk in Poland. The flight is expected to take 40 to 45 days.
The Northern Sea Route is the shortest waterway between the European part of Russia and the Far East, which runs through the seas of the Arctic Ocean. Compared to the Suez Canal, cargo delivery from Asia to Europe via the NSR is almost twice as fast.
If successful, the South Korean authorities plan to launch regular commercial transportation through the Arctic by 2030.
The country's plans, as Reuters found out, have already caused discontent in the West due to the fact that for the flight it is necessary to obtain permission for the passage of the vessel from Russia. Other consultations with Moscow will be required. In particular, during their stay in the internal sea waters of the Russian Federation, foreign vessels must use the services of pilotage and, if necessary, icebreaking services.
"We want to isolate Russia, we don't want to interact with it," the agency quoted one of the European diplomats commenting on the situation.
Limited set of sanctions
At the official level, relations between Russia and South Korea were previously called a "strategic partnership," but the real cooperation was limited to economics. Until 2022, the country was consistently among the ten largest trading partners of the Russian Federation.
There were no unsolvable problems in the relations between the two sides, so Seoul expects that with the completion of its cooperation, cooperation will return to its previous level. According to Konstantin Asmolov, a leading researcher at the Center for Korean Studies of the Russian Academy of Sciences, "in South Korea, the CBO is not perceived as an event that radically changes the nature of relations, and is not positioned as a confrontation based on the "difference in values of democratic Korea" and "authoritarian Russia." There is no obvious Russophobia in the country's politics either.
— From the very beginning of the introduction of anti-Russian sanctions by Western countries, Seoul reluctantly "trailed behind." In 2014, the South Korean leadership managed not to officially impose restrictions, but in 2022 it had to demonstrate solidarity," the expert explained.
As a result, South Korea joined financial measures against Russian banks, government bonds and funds, as well as a ban on the export of strategic materials to Russia. In response, Moscow added the country to the official list of foreign states and territories that commit unfriendly acts against the Russian Federation. Most of the mechanisms of intergovernmental cooperation were frozen, as well as direct flights between the countries were stopped.
By 2024, the sanctions list against Russia and Belarus has grown to 1,402 commodity items. It includes metal-cutting equipment, optical instrument parts, sensors, cars worth more than $50,000, and equipment for the oil and gas industry.
At the same time, unlike European and Japanese companies, South Korean businesses were in no hurry to leave the Russian market. A number of large companies have managed to make increased profits in Russia.
"From the point of view of official Seoul, South Korea performs a minimal set of actions that allow it to declare that it is together with the 'international community' on the issue of anti—Russian sanctions," Asmolov explained. At the same time, the South Korean authorities hope that Moscow will understand the country's position, which shows that the republic has fulfilled only the minimum and is ready to cooperate.
Seoul, for example, as noted by Russian Ambassador Georgy Zinoviev, refrained from supplying weapons and military equipment to the Kiev regime, "which made it possible to preserve the foundation of Russian-South Korean relations."
After President Lee Jae-myung came to power, anti-Russian rhetoric typical of the rule of his predecessor, conservative Yoon Seok-young, is no longer heard from South Korea. Individual contacts have also resumed.
But there have been no fundamental changes at the official level: Seoul maintains anti-Russian sanctions, does not undertake significant diplomatic initiatives against Moscow, and only supports cooperation to a limited extent where it is necessary for the republic itself.
Beneficial to both countries
Nevertheless, South Korea is well aware of the potential benefits of using the NSR for cargo transportation, especially given the problems with navigation in the Strait of Hormuz. After coming to power, President Lee Jae-myung relied on the development of Arctic shipping. He does not rule out the transformation of Busan into a global center of maritime cargo transportation and increasing the country's importance in the global economy.
It is not only the Korean side that is talking about the resumption of cooperation between Moscow and Seoul in the field of transportation along the Northern Sea Route. In April, Igor Tonkovidov, the head of Sovcomflot, offered to work on this possibility. In particular, they discussed returning to the issue of supplying the Russian company with three Arctic-class gas tankers ordered from the South Korean DSME (Daewoo Shipbuilding & Marine Engineering). These vessels were planned to be involved in Sovcomflot projects, including the export of liquefied natural gas from Arctic LNG-2. Due to the sanctions, the contract worth $872.1 million was never executed.
Speaking at one of the sessions of the St. Petersburg Transport and Logistics Forum, President of the Korean-Russian Business Council Park Jung Ho said that Seoul was "greatly interested in cooperation with the Russian Federation," in particular in the framework of the Northern Sea Route.
South Korea is confident that the NSR can become a good alternative to Middle Eastern routes. However, Brussels may create obstacles to cooperation between Seoul and Moscow. The 20th package of European Union sanctions against Russia, adopted at the end of April this year, includes a ban on the provision of maintenance services for Russian LNG tankers and icebreakers, as well as restrictions against the port in Murmansk.
South Korean companies are afraid of being sanctioned by the EU. PanStar Line Dot Com was the only company that applied to participate in the pilot project. Larger and more well-known companies chose to stay away, despite the fact that the country's official authorities supported this project.
NSR without Russia
Oleg Kiryanov, head of the Asia Risk Research Center, believes that Lee Jae-myung's administration has decided on the Russian direction: its policy is not confrontation or normalization, but a controlled freezing of relations.
Russia, according to the political scientist, "is not excluded from Seoul's calculations, but is pushed to the periphery: cooperation is allowed where Korea needs it or does not affect sanctions, and in all other cases Seoul considers it rational to wait for a change in the international situation."
"This line can be maintained for a long time, so Russia needs its own independent and long—term concept of relations with the Republic of Korea, based on Russian interests and not reducible to a derivative of relations with the DPRK or a general confrontation with the West, especially since Russia and South Korea are increasingly drifting towards opposing camps," the expert explained.
Separately, he added that by integrating into NATO's military-industrial chains, Seoul is objectively increasing the alliance's military capabilities, which Moscow will perceive as a threat. And if more anti-Russian conservatives come to power in the republic later, the course may be reduced to participation in openly anti-Russian mechanisms.
As for the NSR, South Korea is showing great interest, Oleg Kiryanov confirmed. However, in the rhetoric of its authorities, this transport corridor exists as if separate from Russia.
"Officials regularly talk about the prospects of the route and test flights, but they mention the need for cooperation with Moscow mainly in response to direct questions from journalists, and often in the form of assurances that this would not violate Western sanctions," the analyst noted.
Because of this, according to him, a paradox arises: Seoul proclaims "the beginning of the era of the Northern Sea Route", while avoiding political interaction with the state, without which the implementation of this task is technically impossible.
And even under the current administration of South Korea, a breakthrough in relations between Moscow and Seoul should not be expected, the expert noted. Therefore, Russia, according to the political scientist, should make the goal for the coming years not accelerated warming, but manageable, albeit "frozen" stability.
— Russia and South Korea have no territorial disputes or natural reasons for mutual hostility. The current cooling is caused by a broader geopolitical confrontation. Even if a quick restoration of partnership is impossible now, Moscow and Seoul should maintain mechanisms that will not allow them to move from political alienation to direct antagonism, otherwise a temporary crisis risks turning into a stable structure of relations for decades, Oleg Kiryanov concluded.
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