The access of countries to nuclear technologies is expanding in the world. What is the threat of this
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- The access of countries to nuclear technologies is expanding in the world. What is the threat of this
The system of nuclear deterrence and non-proliferation, based on a closed club of selected Powers, is gradually collapsing. New agreements, from the US nuclear deal with Saudi Arabia to the AUKUS agreement, open up access to sensitive technologies to more and more countries. This is becoming a factor in increasing nuclear competition, which has no stable control. How attitudes towards nuclear capabilities are changing in the world and what consequences they threaten — in the Izvestia article.
A signal from Saudi Arabia
The decades-old nuclear safety system, which included a strictly defined circle of countries that did not let anyone near their technologies, is gradually becoming a thing of the past. In recent years, it has become increasingly noticeable how a new system is being formed, more multilateral and regionalized, in which new non-nuclear countries are involved in various formats, which makes it less transparent, stable and predictable.
• The agreement between the United States and Saudi Arabia has become a striking event that speaks about changes in attitudes towards nuclear technology. It differs from similar agreements in the absence of an outright ban on uranium enrichment and reprocessing of spent nuclear fuel. It also does not include an additional protocol to the agreement with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), which would provide inspectors with expanded powers, including the right to sudden inspections.
This is in stark contrast to the way the United States usually enters into nuclear agreements. In 2009, the agreement with the UAE was called the "gold standard," as it contained a direct ban on uranium enrichment and reprocessing and became a kind of nonproliferation benchmark. In 2025, the United States signed a less stringent treaty with Thailand, but it also did not provide for the transfer of sensitive nuclear technology. The current agreement with Saudi Arabia provides it with the most comprehensive range of nuclear capabilities that a non-nuclear country could not count on until recently.
A continuing trend
• The agreement between Washington and Riyadh cannot be considered the first signal of a changing order of things. Similar cases, when the threshold of nuclear presence is gradually moving further away, occur in various parts of the planet. Although this does not necessarily indicate the desire of countries to obtain nuclear weapons and destroy the existing security architecture, it nevertheless leads to an alarming weakening of barriers between peaceful atom, enrichment technologies and the military component.
• For example, a trilateral agreement between Australia, the United States and the United Kingdom, known as AUKUS, entered into force in 2025. It provides for the creation of a nuclear submarine fleet in Australia, for which it will receive nuclear technologies from two other parties, and a separate "Geelong Treaty" has been signed with the UK, laying a long-term foundation for bilateral industrial and technological cooperation.
• Although it is emphasized that Australia will deploy conventional weapons on submarines, nuclear reactors, fissile materials and weapons-grade highly enriched uranium, which will not be under IAEA safeguards, will be transferred to them. This sets a precedent that could violate the nuclear nonproliferation regime.
• The trend towards the spread of nuclear technology includes the practice of deploying nuclear weapons outside the territories of members of the nuclear club. Finland and Japan, which previously observed strict prohibitions on the import, transit, storage, production, and even more so the use of nuclear weapons, are abandoning the legislative taboo. Iran has also lifted legal restrictions that oblige it to cooperate with the IAEA and maintain transparency of its current nuclear program. Moscow and Minsk have secured expanded security guarantees that have allowed the deployment of Russian tactical nuclear weapons on the territory of Belarus.
They undermine the old system of nuclear deterrence and accelerate the development of new weapons and nuclear technologies. In 2025, the United States announced the accelerated deployment of advanced nuclear reactors for national security in order to use them at military and critical facilities. This will lead to a close convergence of the nuclear and defense sectors, potentially giving production chains a dual purpose in addition to purely civilian ones.
• The intentions of countries such as Sweden and Italy to develop nuclear energy and build nuclear reactors also fall into the same canvas. Although such actions are largely motivated by economic considerations, they still lead to increased access to nuclear technologies and enhance industrial competencies. With them, the time between a political decision and the development of the military potential of nuclear technology will be reduced.
Reducing nuclear safety
• All these processes are gradually changing the structure of nuclear safety in various aspects. Previously, nuclear weapons were a passive insurance policy against global conflict, the last argument against a full-scale war between their owners, which was not even discussed. Nuclear weapons were not part of everyday military strategic planning, due to the fact that their actual use was not possible.
• However, now the more countries master nuclear technologies, the wider the geography of the deployment of warheads becomes, the deeper the cooperation between nuclear countries and non-nuclear ones becomes, the wider the problem of keeping actors from using nuclear weapons becomes. The behavioral model in relation to nuclear weapons is moving away from deterrence to competition for possession. Possession provokes use. It is no coincidence that in the past decades, the leading nuclear countries sought to reduce their arsenals, thus assuming to reduce the risk that the enemy would use weapons. But now this process has not only been stopped, but also reversed.
• In the near future, the build-up of nuclear technologies will lead to the fact that nuclear countries will begin to actively explore the issues of its use. This will include identifying targets, identifying carriers, interacting with allies, and combining nuclear strikes with non-nuclear ones. So far, such scenarios will be hypothetical. But the very fact that countries will start developing them will indicate their readiness to implement them at one moment. Those who develop military plans do not do so in order for these plans to remain on paper.
• Other countries are increasingly approaching the dangerous line beyond which the development of peaceful nuclear energy is already turning into the development of a real nuclear warhead. Such States do not violate international agreements, much less conduct tests, but they can bring the matter to an end at any moment and create confusion in the global balance of nuclear forces. It will become impossible to control and direct this process, as everything will depend solely on the political will of the leadership of a particular country.
• Even if countries capable of developing nuclear weapons do not take such a desperate step, their competitors will fear such a development and seek similar actions. This threatens irreversible tension in regions such as the Middle East and the Korean Peninsula, where several nuclear weapons owners could potentially arise. Other, outwardly calm regions may follow their example and find themselves in the epicenter of instability if one of the players wants to use its nuclear uncertainty to spread influence.
• Those who do not yet know nuclear technology at all, even at a basic level, see the unfolding processes and will want to participate in them. Providing access to technology to an increasing number of countries erodes its value, reduces vigilance against it, and undermines regulation. At the same time, the dangerous consequences of nuclear know-how do not disappear anywhere. The secret information held by the exclusive club of countries is no longer so secret as more and more countries want to have their own nuclear submarines and nuclear reactors. States no longer seek to disarm, they will want to have a backup route in case of a worst-case escalation.
• The widespread proliferation of nuclear technologies should be expected to turn into a permanent and at the same time toxic topic in international relations. They can be used as bargaining, blackmail, encouragement, and a tool to influence other countries. Nuclear-related negotiations will gradually replace classical diplomacy and economic cooperation. Because of this, some countries will find themselves deeply dependent on others, while others will have the opportunity to engage in the most acute and irreconcilable confrontation as soon as they reach nuclear parity.
• This state of affairs will require the search for new formats of the world order. The old one, under the auspices of the United Nations, has already completely exhausted itself, since it was created under the condition that the nuclear club would remain a closed community of individual powers. Universal rules that apply to everyone will be replaced by less effective bilateral agreements that fragment the world order into separate centers of power.
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