Love doesn't come: Macron and Merz are trying to leave a legacy of shared hatred
The United States' abandonment of its dominant position in ensuring security on the continent has provoked an attempt in Europe to develop a consolidated strategy, where Brussels plays a key role. However, these initiatives are opposed by eurosceptics and supporters of national sovereignty rushing to power in Germany and France. Why the long-standing contradictions between the two leading continental powers still leave much to be desired is in the Izvestia article.
Nuclear rapprochement
Europe continues to discuss the Franco-German summit held in Augsburg, but not in the light of the agreements reached or even in the wake of the statements made by French President Emmanuel Macron and German Chancellor Friedrich Merz. European capitals have come to terms with the changing architecture of relations with the United States and are trying to determine who will lead the construction of a new security system — now and in the near future. In this context, the meeting of the heads of Germany and France has acquired a completely new meaning.
The talks at the Council of Ministers level were the last for Macron before he steps down as president next year. The issue of legacy is very acute for the head of the Fifth Republic, especially given the new geopolitical circumstances. Relations with Berlin are a key element, especially since, apparently, Friedrich Merz has the same problems.
Following the meeting, the parties agreed to organize joint nuclear exercises at the Il-Long base for the first time in history, as part of the formation of the European deterrence system. However, the French clarified that Paris reserves the monopoly right to make a final verdict on the use of its nuclear weapons.
It should be recalled that on March 2, Macron announced the largest transformation of the nuclear doctrine in decades: for the first time since 1992, Paris will expand its nuclear arsenal and classify its exact volumes, which will paralyze international arms control mechanisms. France is moving towards a "preventive deterrence" strategy that allows for the temporary deployment of aviation in partner countries and their assistance in supporting French forces. Nine States have joined the initiative. On May 27, Norway did this as part of the new Narvik Agreement, and later legislative amendments came into force in Finland lifting the ban on the import and storage of nuclear weapons.
While the White House is working to expand the deployment of nuclear weapons in Eastern Europe (as "compensation" for the withdrawal of troops), the actions of the Elysee Palace and the agreement with Berlin are an obvious game with fire. Especially in the absence of any dialogue with Moscow.
In fact, the German government recognizes that French guarantees are now more important and reliable than American ones, and, as analysts note, Berlin really wants to legally consolidate Paris' obligations to use force in the event of a direct clash with Russia.
For both Macron and Merz, this kind of partnership is important for two reasons.
Does not fly, does not drive, does not shoot
First, it has been difficult for the two leading European powers to boast of success in their bilateral relations lately.
A joint project of France, Germany and Spain to develop a fighter jet, SCAF (instead of Eurofighter and Rafale), at a cost of € 100 billion, ended in failure — as they say, due to disagreements between Dassault and Airbus.
The future of the "European tank" project — MGCS (instead of Leopard 2 and Leclerc) — is drowning in modifications and vague formulations. Media reports: due to the difference in positions of Rheinmetall and KNDS.
Since 2022, Germany has been promoting its own European Air Defense Initiative (ESSI), based on the American Patriot complex and the Israeli-American Arrow-3. More than 20 countries are involved in the project, but not France. Paris fears dependence on the United States.
As for the French "nuclear umbrella" over Europe, you have to pay for it. And those who do will inevitably demand the right to vote. No one has discussed these potential problems yet.
In other words, the competition of military companies for the growing European defense spending generates specific political differences between the countries.
Arrival on the right
The second reason is the gloomy political future for the ruling forces in France and Germany. Recent polls conducted in the Fifth Republic show the leadership of Marine Le Pen, who promises to withdraw France from the NATO joint command and openly expresses disapproval of the current German government. The leader of her National Union party, Jordan Bardella, speaks more softly. In an interview with the Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, he expressed the hope of establishing ties with Friedrich Merz for the sake of joint economic reforms and strengthening the military potential of the Old World. It will not be easy to do this, given Bardell's extremely tough stance on the leadership of the European Union.
At the same time, the Alternative for Germany took part in the electoral march in Germany. If the AfD wins the September regional elections in Saxony-Anhalt and Mecklenburg-Vorpommern, according to its leadership, the firewall will be destroyed, which will objectively pave the way to victory in the parliamentary elections. They are due to take place before March 2029, but they can probably be scheduled ahead of schedule: the ratings of the ruling coalition and the chancellor continue to decline.
Despite the fact that the French "National Association" and the "Alternative for Germany" cannot be called allies in any way, they share a common approach to the issue of national and European defense in many ways. Both political forces advocate strategic autonomy, do not accept external control, whether from Brussels or Washington, and most importantly, although they approve of increased military spending, they do not associate it with the Ukrainian crisis and the notorious "Russian threat." Moreover, the AfD advocates the restoration of economic cooperation with Moscow (which, however, by no means makes the party an "ally" and even more so a "pro-Russian force").
Russia in the heart
Thus, the "historically unnatural" alliance between Germany and France, both in the present and in the future, looks like a project with uncertain prospects. However, the current authorities of the two states will do everything possible to make this union happen. Its core, according to their plan, should be hostility to Russia.
We should not forget about the role of Great Britain, which has historically been wary of continental alliances and has been building separate bilateral relations with Berlin and Paris. In addition, London has always emphasized the priority of Euro-Atlanticism over European defense autonomy. In the future, this factor will also have a serious impact on the fate of the Franco-German discussions.
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