They gave a reason: mass phone calls were legally allowed in Russia
State Duma deputies at the plenary session adopted a bill that proposes to allow mass calls to inform subscribers in cases established by Russian law. This initiative is aimed at promptly warning citizens about threats, but, according to experts, it requires careful consideration of implementation mechanisms, since attackers very easily mimic the new rules. All the details are in the Izvestia article.
Details of the new law on mass calls
State Duma deputies at the plenary session adopted in the second and third readings a bill that proposes to allow mass calls to inform subscribers in cases established by Russian law. This initiative is part of the second package of measures to counter cyberbullying. According to current regulations, mass calls can only be initiated by government agencies, which previously limited the capabilities of private entities.
The innovations provide that such calls will also be allowed to inform subscribers if the initiator is required to do so on the basis of federal laws or documents authored by the president, the government or the Central Bank. For example, banks will be required to make such calls in order to protect customers from fraudsters and prevent theft of funds. The law emphasizes that no fees will be charged for such mass calls, which guarantees that there will be no financial burden on the recipient of the information.
At the same time, the customer of mass calls will be obliged to inform subscribers why these calls are being made, ensuring full transparency of communication. The First BIT company explains that the main difference between the new law is that, in addition to government agencies, mass calls were allowed to banks, but only to ensure security. The law also requires notification of the purpose of the call and the absence of charges for the subscriber, which are understandable requirements aimed at protecting citizens.
Softline Group of Companies (MD Audit) explains that the innovation will primarily affect mass services with regular communication: banks, public services, housing and communal services, logistics and delivery, as well as insurance and telecom companies. At the same time, there will be a key transition from SMS and push notifications to voice channels in situations where it is important to ensure that information is conveyed to the subscriber.
The risks of mimicry and new scenarios of deception
If mass calls are allowed to inform, a legitimate question arises: how will ordinary people be able to distinguish useful notifications from fraudulent ones, and will attackers use this loophole even more actively? Kirill Levkin, Project manager at Softline Group (MD Audit), points out that the risk of substitution is really high. He attributes this to the fact that as soon as mass calls become a legitimate channel, attackers begin to disguise themselves as it. The key difference lies in the absence of interactive pressure, since legitimate notifications do not require urgent action, do not request codes or card data.
—The format of the "robocall with important information" actually coincides with the scenarios of scammers," the source notes.
Relying only on behavioral signs is no longer enough, as attackers quickly copy new scenarios. ITMO University also warns that attackers will quickly adapt and start using phrases like "we are calling according to the new law", "mandatory notification" or "anti-fraud check". Therefore, the call should only be a notification channel, not a decision-making channel, and it should also exclude any codes, links, or app installations.
Gazinformservice points out that the main risk is blurring the simple rule that a mass call is suspicious. In practice, this measure will only create a new legend for social engineering, and the effect is likely to be minimal. 6-12 months after the law comes into force, the "legitimate notification with continuation" scenario is likely to intensify, when a supposedly official call is followed by a secondary contact with an attempt to lure data.
Which areas will be affected by the measure in the coming years
In the next one to two years, this measure will affect mass services with regular communication, changing the usual order of interaction with customers. First of all, these are banks that will use suspicious event notifications, as well as government and municipal services to promptly notify the public. Insurance and telecom companies will also actively join, where the practice of notification already exists, but it was previously limited by regulatory barriers.
Literally any sphere where mass events take place will be influenced by the new rules and will begin to adapt their processes. Representatives of housing and communal services, medicine, and marketplaces will begin calling customers to inform them about debts, accidents, or current order statuses. The key change is the transition from SMS and push notifications to voice channels in situations where it is critically important to ensure that information is delivered to the recipient.
This will expand the usage scenarios, but at the same time increase the burden on users' trust in voice communications in general. ITMO emphasizes that any action should take place only through the official website, mobile application, or an independent call to a verified number. Citizens need to be alert and double-check any information they receive without telling the operators the codes from SMS or notifications.
The burden on operators and the risk of rising tariffs for subscribers
The growth in voice traffic will be noticeable, especially if mass notifications become a regular and ubiquitous practice for large organizations. For telecom operators, this means the objective need to scale anti-fraud systems, strengthen filtering and prioritize incoming traffic. Operators will receive a regular increase in requirements for filtering, labeling, and generally contractual work with customers of mass calls.
The main cost increase will be related not so much to technical voice transmission as to ensuring a high level of trust in the communication channel. This includes verification of sources, combating number substitution, and deep integration with external security systems. Direct cost transfer to subscribers in the form of tariff increases can not be expected explicitly, but indirectly costs can be included in the cost of services or companies.
Ivan Barchuk, IT Director at Yakov & Partners, draws attention to the potential risks of payments to fraud victims if companies fail to comply with the requirements to prevent fraudulent transactions. If a subscriber with a monthly tariff of 1,000 rubles receives an illegal call and gives 1 million rubles to fraudsters, they may require the operator to compensate for the stolen funds. This situation will not be unique, so it is assumed that this may lead to some increase in all tariffs on the market.
When will the protection tools become available to most
In the coming years, people will be protected not by one isolated technology, but by a complex combination of several interrelated tools. Senator Artem Sheikin notes that, first of all, it is the labeling and verification of calls so that a person can see who is calling him: a bank, a government organization, a delivery service or an unknown number. This reduces the risk of substitution and helps users identify potential scammers faster at an early stage.
The second area is the anti—fraud systems of banks and telecom operators that analyze suspicious calls, mass calls, abnormal transfers and atypical customer behavior. The faster the bank and the operator exchange such signals, the more difficult it is for fraudsters to bring their scheme to an end. Infrastructure-based solutions will be most effective, including voice tags and behavioral analysis to identify abnormal scenarios.
Basic tools such as call labeling, anti-spam filters, and warnings in banking applications will become widespread in the next year or two. More complex integration of all anti-fraud systems will require more time and coordination between market participants. The main principle is simple: protection should be multi—layered - on the side of the individual, the bank, the telecom operator and the state, which confirms the need for an integrated approach.
Kirill Levkin emphasizes that, in general, scammers will play on blurring the line between a "service" and a "dangerous" call, so protection should shift from the user level to the ecosystem level. A separate risk is combined attacks, where a call, SMS and push notification strengthen trust in each other, and this can only be countered by the joint efforts of all participants in the communications market and financial organizations.
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